The Forgotten Argument
By Michaela Willi
This past week, the American population was divided into two camps: Republicans and Democrats. We commonly define our ideas by such oppo-sites: liberal v. conservative, theist v. atheist, Christian v. Muslim, Protestant v. Catholic, idealist v. pragma-tist, modernist v. relativist. Two opposing systems of thought that have largely fallen out of usage are realism and nominalism.
Realism is a belief in universals. Realists see the essence of an object as part of a larger, abstract category. A squirrel is not so much an individual creature as it a replication of the ideal of squirrelness. Thus there exists a universal squirrelness somewhere in the metaphysical reality. In the same way, men and women are essentially variations of the metaphysical prototype rather than individuals that resemble one another. Our differences are not our essence, but rather our similarities, which reflect the ideal of humanity.
Nominalism is a reaction against realism. Nominal-
ists deny that the essence of a creature is found in its genre. They deny that a specific person or squirrel is primarily defined by its humanity or squirrelness. Rather, the human mind notes similarities between unique individuals and categorizes them for the sake of convenience. Similarities allow us to put individuals in categories but they are not the essence of the man.
Although the terms realist and nominalist originated in the Middle Ages, the philosophical systems that underlie them began in ancient philosophy. Realism, strangely enough, used to be known as idealism. We first read of this in Plato, when he posited the theory of Forms. For Plato, there is an ideal realm where the essence of all objects exists - an ideal chair, an ideal squirrel and, presumably, an ideal man.
Philosophers still debate the extent to which Aristotle deviated from Plato. Aristotle's methods seem closer to nominalism, even if he did not intentionally begin a new school. His school, although originally termed "realist," focused on concrete evidence from which we can induce general principles, just as the nominalists believe we create categories by observing accidental similarities.
Plato's school was revived and radicalized in the third century A.D. by Plotinus and his followers. These neo-Platonists relied less on logic than did Plato and were much more mystical, often even considered pantheistic. They believed that the Forms Plato described existed in reality. By taking Platonism a step beyond Plato, they furthered the distance between idealism and realism.
Plato's idealism became known as realism in the Middle Ages. Until the twelfth century, realism was the orthodox position of the Catholic Church. In the late eleventh century, the philosopher Roscelin was condemned as a heretic for his deviant position on universals. His position was propagated by his famous student Peter Abelard. As a young man, Abelard challenged the Parisian archdeacon, William of Cham-peaux, causing William partially to retract his position on realism. Abelard put forth a form of soft nominalism he called "conceptualism," which asserted that, although universals do not exist apart from individuals, they are necessary constructions to comprehend the world. William of Ockham, famous among logicians for formulating "Ockham's razor," was also a nominalist. Thomas Aquinas tried to reconcile the two positions, although he favored realism.
These abstract philosophical distinctions may not hold the fascination of "bottom-line" Americans because they do not appear to be practical or relevant. Such a view underestimates the importance of universals, whose importance reaches beyond the merely semantic. Realism and nominalism were actually decisive historical catalysts. Meryick Carre, who wrote an excellent book on the debate, believes that Ockham's nominalism directly led to the birth of science and the Protestant Reformation whereas Augustine's realism prefigured Descartes and the Enlightenment. Carre claims that contemporary socialists who uphold ideals of the State are direct descendents of the realists while radical individualists are heirs of the nominalists.
Whether or not we accept Carre's grandiose evaluation of the historical importance of realism and nominalism, he is certainly correct in asserting that these ancient philosophies fostered modern, influential ones. We can use the concept of universals as a new way to evaluate our own ideas. Is a chair a chair because we see the similarity between it and other things that are meant to be sat in or because it is essentially a chair? Is there really such a thing as ideal beauty or are concepts of attractiveness only social constructs? Is a mentally-impaired woman still more human than a smart ape that can perform more of the functions we associate with humanity? The realism versus nominalism debate provides insight into questions ranging in importance from intellectual brainteasers to social ethics.
This past week, the American population was divided into two camps: Republicans and Democrats. We commonly define our ideas by such oppo-sites: liberal v. conservative, theist v. atheist, Christian v. Muslim, Protestant v. Catholic, idealist v. pragma-tist, modernist v. relativist. Two opposing systems of thought that have largely fallen out of usage are realism and nominalism.
Realism is a belief in universals. Realists see the essence of an object as part of a larger, abstract category. A squirrel is not so much an individual creature as it a replication of the ideal of squirrelness. Thus there exists a universal squirrelness somewhere in the metaphysical reality. In the same way, men and women are essentially variations of the metaphysical prototype rather than individuals that resemble one another. Our differences are not our essence, but rather our similarities, which reflect the ideal of humanity.
Nominalism is a reaction against realism. Nominal-
ists deny that the essence of a creature is found in its genre. They deny that a specific person or squirrel is primarily defined by its humanity or squirrelness. Rather, the human mind notes similarities between unique individuals and categorizes them for the sake of convenience. Similarities allow us to put individuals in categories but they are not the essence of the man.
Although the terms realist and nominalist originated in the Middle Ages, the philosophical systems that underlie them began in ancient philosophy. Realism, strangely enough, used to be known as idealism. We first read of this in Plato, when he posited the theory of Forms. For Plato, there is an ideal realm where the essence of all objects exists - an ideal chair, an ideal squirrel and, presumably, an ideal man.
Philosophers still debate the extent to which Aristotle deviated from Plato. Aristotle's methods seem closer to nominalism, even if he did not intentionally begin a new school. His school, although originally termed "realist," focused on concrete evidence from which we can induce general principles, just as the nominalists believe we create categories by observing accidental similarities.
Plato's school was revived and radicalized in the third century A.D. by Plotinus and his followers. These neo-Platonists relied less on logic than did Plato and were much more mystical, often even considered pantheistic. They believed that the Forms Plato described existed in reality. By taking Platonism a step beyond Plato, they furthered the distance between idealism and realism.
Plato's idealism became known as realism in the Middle Ages. Until the twelfth century, realism was the orthodox position of the Catholic Church. In the late eleventh century, the philosopher Roscelin was condemned as a heretic for his deviant position on universals. His position was propagated by his famous student Peter Abelard. As a young man, Abelard challenged the Parisian archdeacon, William of Cham-peaux, causing William partially to retract his position on realism. Abelard put forth a form of soft nominalism he called "conceptualism," which asserted that, although universals do not exist apart from individuals, they are necessary constructions to comprehend the world. William of Ockham, famous among logicians for formulating "Ockham's razor," was also a nominalist. Thomas Aquinas tried to reconcile the two positions, although he favored realism.
These abstract philosophical distinctions may not hold the fascination of "bottom-line" Americans because they do not appear to be practical or relevant. Such a view underestimates the importance of universals, whose importance reaches beyond the merely semantic. Realism and nominalism were actually decisive historical catalysts. Meryick Carre, who wrote an excellent book on the debate, believes that Ockham's nominalism directly led to the birth of science and the Protestant Reformation whereas Augustine's realism prefigured Descartes and the Enlightenment. Carre claims that contemporary socialists who uphold ideals of the State are direct descendents of the realists while radical individualists are heirs of the nominalists.
Whether or not we accept Carre's grandiose evaluation of the historical importance of realism and nominalism, he is certainly correct in asserting that these ancient philosophies fostered modern, influential ones. We can use the concept of universals as a new way to evaluate our own ideas. Is a chair a chair because we see the similarity between it and other things that are meant to be sat in or because it is essentially a chair? Is there really such a thing as ideal beauty or are concepts of attractiveness only social constructs? Is a mentally-impaired woman still more human than a smart ape that can perform more of the functions we associate with humanity? The realism versus nominalism debate provides insight into questions ranging in importance from intellectual brainteasers to social ethics.
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