The Protestantism of Kierkegaard
By Matthew Brownfield
Søren Kierkegaard concludes the third problema of Fear and Trembling by writing, "Either there is a paradox, that the single individual as the particular stands in an absolute relation to the absolute, or Abraham is done for" (144). According to Kierkegaard, the knight of faith carries on an unmediated relationship with God. By necessity, he is "God's confidant, the Lord's friend, and... [addresses] God in heaven as Thou'" (105). These statements, if read in isolation, might pass as Protestant platitudes; however, their implication for ethics merit a more serious exploration. When Kierkegaard speaks of an "absolute relation to the absolute," he is placing the knight of faith, in this case Abraham, beyond the realm of the ethical. Through Abraham's active willingness to sacrifice his son, the patriarch transcends the universal (ethical) on the strength of the absurd. According to Kierkegaard, this necessary "leap of faith" frees Abraham, and all subsequent knights of faith, from ethical considerations. One is to act only in "absolute relation to the absolute." This suspension of a shared ethic marks Kierkegaard's departure from general Protestant thought.
It is an accepted Protestant belief that Christ is the sole mediator between God and man. Since Christ is one with God. and since man knows Christ through faith, Protestants should agree that a knight of faith knows God in an absolute way through faith. However, Kierkegaard goes further than most Protestants by claiming that this intimate relationship with God necessarily transcends the ethical. This difference in position stems from two related disagreements. First, Kierkegaard considers the ethical to be the sole property of the "systematizers," a group of philosophers whom he despises. And, second. Kierkegaard believes Abraham's act must be replicable by others in order for Abraham to be the "founder of faith."
Both the Preface and Epilogue seem to suggest one of the underlying purposes for Fear and Trembling was to expose the inhumanity of the moral musings of Hegel and Kant. Kierkegaard responds to their systematic, antiseptic view of man's interaction with God with a bold cry for faith. He attacks the notion that "the ethical is the universal and as such, in turn, the divine" (98). For Kierkegaard, there must be a higher telos than the ethical, and God must be known more intimately than "in an altogether abstract sense as the divine" (98). Kierkegaard wants the modem moralist to look into the souls of individual men, not to force a general framework on top of humanity. He also wants people to taste the fear men once felt toward God and to recognize the struggle of faith. For Kierkegaard, neither God nor mankind can be categorized in neat divisions.
An attack upon the ethics of modernity is not necessarily in contradiction with Protestantism. However, denying the basis for shared, knowable standards for actions presents a conflict with Protestant thought. Kierkegaard, using the narrative of Abraham, totally individualizes the ability to judge moral action. He says, "Faith is just this paradox, that the single individual is higher than the universal,...that having been in the universal, the single individual sets himself apart as the particular above the universal" (84). Abraham, the knight of faith, breaks an ethical command not to murder by his plan to sacrifice his son. Through this action, Abraham receives God's praise and proves his faith. Therefore, for Kierkegaard, the act of faith can include the breaking of an ethical standard. Kierkegaard does not make a public transgression of the ethical a necessary part of becoming the knight of faith (e.g., the knight of faith described on 68-69), but, rather, requires an internal denial of the universal and an absolute trust in the absolute. This paradox, the teleological suspension of the ethical, explains how Abraham can be the knight of faith while disobeying a universal commandment of God.
Kierkegaard succeeds in destroying the idea that obedience to a systematized ethic is the highest end of man, but he also destroys the idea that any universal (i.e., known and shared) ethical standards bind the knight of faith. Protestants can agree with the first point of destruction. For the Protestant, ethics is a sub-category for judging action, not the end of action. Man's highest duty is to God. However, in contradiction to the second destruction, man also has the duty to love his neighbor. The Bible is very specific about the ways one loves his neighbor. Scripture relates many universal prohibitions against actions, such as theft, murder, rape, and lying. These standards are written for all to see, and scripture commands Christians to rebuke one another when individuals transgress these rules. Protestants cannot ignore these scriptural commands. Therefore, while they may agree with Kierkegaard that the "systematizers" needed to be destroyed, Scripture provides a basis for ethics apart from the theories of modernity.
The problem for the Protestants centers on the fact that God commanded Abraham to kill Isaac, an innocent. This appears to be inconsistent with even the scriptural ethic. So, Protestants must provide a solution that allows for Abraham's action to be praiseworthy, but still maintains the universal principles revealed in Scripture. The solution to the dilemma involves the second Kierkegaardian and Protestant disagreement.
The general response to the question of replic-ability concerning Abraham's act, a response which seems to chafe Kierkegaard, is that God was testing Abraham's faith at a very specific time, in a specific manner, and for a specific purpose. Kierkegaard's response is that if Abraham's act is qualified by context, then "let's forget him, for why bother remembering a past that cannot be made into a present" (60). In order for Kierkegaard's framework to hold, in order for Abraham to be the "founder of faith," an act similar to Abraham's must be replicable by any knight of faith. He makes this point by condemning the modem-day
preacher who overflows with righteous indignation toward the insomniac who considers killing his own son (58-59, 81). Kierkegaard does not want to judge off-hand, for perhaps the insomniac, like Abraham, is a knight of faith who stands in an "absolute relation to the absolute." However, a Protestant would quickly condemn the insomniac, for it is against the law of God to murder, and the killing of an innocent is murder. The Protestant position is that God does not reveal himself in an individual fashion in order to command an individual to transgress scripture.
Protestants do not need Abraham's act to be replicable in order for Abraham to be the father of faith, for Protestants make a distinction in the way God relates to man. Man receives salvation directly from God, knows God in a personal way, worships God without mediation, and prays directly to God. In this regard, man stands in an "absolute relation to the absolute." However, God has revealed his laws for action in a universal manner. All men can look at Scripture and can discern the way they should act. In this regard, man's understanding of God is mediated by Scripture, and he is then bound by the universal.
Therefore, Abraham is still the founder of Faith, for he was the first to receive the promise of the Messiah. He teaches Christians the way to worship God, and the gives an example of humble obedience. However, Abraham is not the founder of ethics. Instead, Abraham operates in a similar way as Aeneas did for the Romans. He transmits an ethic from one city to the next. Both Aeneas and Abraham left the land of their fathers for the purpose of establishing a new kingdom. As such, the ethics of a people were internalized in one person for the purpose of transmission to a new land. This arrangement was not permanent. When Rome rose, and law was established, citizens obeyed it. It did not matter that Aeneas, the model for the pious man, did things they were forbidden to do. for he was in the special position of bearing within his family the gods of future Rome. In the same way, Abraham the man represents the whole people of God. God planted within him and his seed the ethic for His future people, and gave Abraham direct revelation in matters of both faith and action. Hence, for Abraham, there was no distinction between the way in which God revealed himself-Abraham stood in an "absolute relation to the absolute." However, after Christ, the Promise of Abraham, established the church and the apostles completed the Scriptures, Christians began to obey the fulfilled law of the city of God. This law presents God's complete revelation concerning action, and does so in a universal manner. As such, Christians are not to transgress the law, for in doing so they disobey God. Furthermore, the completeness of the law means that God will not reveal
Himself in a different way in the future. Therefore, Christians stand in an "absolute relation to the absolute" in matters of faith, but God mediates himself to them through Scripture for matters of practice.
In conclusion, while Kierkegaard effectively destroys the shallow view of ethics presented by the "systematizers," he fails to address a Protestant view of ethics and the distinctions Protestants make concerning the way God reveals Himself to man. In doing so, he too hastily relieves the knight of faith from his secondary duty to the universal for the purposes of his primary duty to God.
Søren Kierkegaard concludes the third problema of Fear and Trembling by writing, "Either there is a paradox, that the single individual as the particular stands in an absolute relation to the absolute, or Abraham is done for" (144). According to Kierkegaard, the knight of faith carries on an unmediated relationship with God. By necessity, he is "God's confidant, the Lord's friend, and... [addresses] God in heaven as Thou'" (105). These statements, if read in isolation, might pass as Protestant platitudes; however, their implication for ethics merit a more serious exploration. When Kierkegaard speaks of an "absolute relation to the absolute," he is placing the knight of faith, in this case Abraham, beyond the realm of the ethical. Through Abraham's active willingness to sacrifice his son, the patriarch transcends the universal (ethical) on the strength of the absurd. According to Kierkegaard, this necessary "leap of faith" frees Abraham, and all subsequent knights of faith, from ethical considerations. One is to act only in "absolute relation to the absolute." This suspension of a shared ethic marks Kierkegaard's departure from general Protestant thought.
It is an accepted Protestant belief that Christ is the sole mediator between God and man. Since Christ is one with God. and since man knows Christ through faith, Protestants should agree that a knight of faith knows God in an absolute way through faith. However, Kierkegaard goes further than most Protestants by claiming that this intimate relationship with God necessarily transcends the ethical. This difference in position stems from two related disagreements. First, Kierkegaard considers the ethical to be the sole property of the "systematizers," a group of philosophers whom he despises. And, second. Kierkegaard believes Abraham's act must be replicable by others in order for Abraham to be the "founder of faith."
Both the Preface and Epilogue seem to suggest one of the underlying purposes for Fear and Trembling was to expose the inhumanity of the moral musings of Hegel and Kant. Kierkegaard responds to their systematic, antiseptic view of man's interaction with God with a bold cry for faith. He attacks the notion that "the ethical is the universal and as such, in turn, the divine" (98). For Kierkegaard, there must be a higher telos than the ethical, and God must be known more intimately than "in an altogether abstract sense as the divine" (98). Kierkegaard wants the modem moralist to look into the souls of individual men, not to force a general framework on top of humanity. He also wants people to taste the fear men once felt toward God and to recognize the struggle of faith. For Kierkegaard, neither God nor mankind can be categorized in neat divisions.
An attack upon the ethics of modernity is not necessarily in contradiction with Protestantism. However, denying the basis for shared, knowable standards for actions presents a conflict with Protestant thought. Kierkegaard, using the narrative of Abraham, totally individualizes the ability to judge moral action. He says, "Faith is just this paradox, that the single individual is higher than the universal,...that having been in the universal, the single individual sets himself apart as the particular above the universal" (84). Abraham, the knight of faith, breaks an ethical command not to murder by his plan to sacrifice his son. Through this action, Abraham receives God's praise and proves his faith. Therefore, for Kierkegaard, the act of faith can include the breaking of an ethical standard. Kierkegaard does not make a public transgression of the ethical a necessary part of becoming the knight of faith (e.g., the knight of faith described on 68-69), but, rather, requires an internal denial of the universal and an absolute trust in the absolute. This paradox, the teleological suspension of the ethical, explains how Abraham can be the knight of faith while disobeying a universal commandment of God.
Kierkegaard succeeds in destroying the idea that obedience to a systematized ethic is the highest end of man, but he also destroys the idea that any universal (i.e., known and shared) ethical standards bind the knight of faith. Protestants can agree with the first point of destruction. For the Protestant, ethics is a sub-category for judging action, not the end of action. Man's highest duty is to God. However, in contradiction to the second destruction, man also has the duty to love his neighbor. The Bible is very specific about the ways one loves his neighbor. Scripture relates many universal prohibitions against actions, such as theft, murder, rape, and lying. These standards are written for all to see, and scripture commands Christians to rebuke one another when individuals transgress these rules. Protestants cannot ignore these scriptural commands. Therefore, while they may agree with Kierkegaard that the "systematizers" needed to be destroyed, Scripture provides a basis for ethics apart from the theories of modernity.
The problem for the Protestants centers on the fact that God commanded Abraham to kill Isaac, an innocent. This appears to be inconsistent with even the scriptural ethic. So, Protestants must provide a solution that allows for Abraham's action to be praiseworthy, but still maintains the universal principles revealed in Scripture. The solution to the dilemma involves the second Kierkegaardian and Protestant disagreement.
The general response to the question of replic-ability concerning Abraham's act, a response which seems to chafe Kierkegaard, is that God was testing Abraham's faith at a very specific time, in a specific manner, and for a specific purpose. Kierkegaard's response is that if Abraham's act is qualified by context, then "let's forget him, for why bother remembering a past that cannot be made into a present" (60). In order for Kierkegaard's framework to hold, in order for Abraham to be the "founder of faith," an act similar to Abraham's must be replicable by any knight of faith. He makes this point by condemning the modem-day
preacher who overflows with righteous indignation toward the insomniac who considers killing his own son (58-59, 81). Kierkegaard does not want to judge off-hand, for perhaps the insomniac, like Abraham, is a knight of faith who stands in an "absolute relation to the absolute." However, a Protestant would quickly condemn the insomniac, for it is against the law of God to murder, and the killing of an innocent is murder. The Protestant position is that God does not reveal himself in an individual fashion in order to command an individual to transgress scripture.
Protestants do not need Abraham's act to be replicable in order for Abraham to be the father of faith, for Protestants make a distinction in the way God relates to man. Man receives salvation directly from God, knows God in a personal way, worships God without mediation, and prays directly to God. In this regard, man stands in an "absolute relation to the absolute." However, God has revealed his laws for action in a universal manner. All men can look at Scripture and can discern the way they should act. In this regard, man's understanding of God is mediated by Scripture, and he is then bound by the universal.
Therefore, Abraham is still the founder of Faith, for he was the first to receive the promise of the Messiah. He teaches Christians the way to worship God, and the gives an example of humble obedience. However, Abraham is not the founder of ethics. Instead, Abraham operates in a similar way as Aeneas did for the Romans. He transmits an ethic from one city to the next. Both Aeneas and Abraham left the land of their fathers for the purpose of establishing a new kingdom. As such, the ethics of a people were internalized in one person for the purpose of transmission to a new land. This arrangement was not permanent. When Rome rose, and law was established, citizens obeyed it. It did not matter that Aeneas, the model for the pious man, did things they were forbidden to do. for he was in the special position of bearing within his family the gods of future Rome. In the same way, Abraham the man represents the whole people of God. God planted within him and his seed the ethic for His future people, and gave Abraham direct revelation in matters of both faith and action. Hence, for Abraham, there was no distinction between the way in which God revealed himself-Abraham stood in an "absolute relation to the absolute." However, after Christ, the Promise of Abraham, established the church and the apostles completed the Scriptures, Christians began to obey the fulfilled law of the city of God. This law presents God's complete revelation concerning action, and does so in a universal manner. As such, Christians are not to transgress the law, for in doing so they disobey God. Furthermore, the completeness of the law means that God will not reveal
Himself in a different way in the future. Therefore, Christians stand in an "absolute relation to the absolute" in matters of faith, but God mediates himself to them through Scripture for matters of practice.
In conclusion, while Kierkegaard effectively destroys the shallow view of ethics presented by the "systematizers," he fails to address a Protestant view of ethics and the distinctions Protestants make concerning the way God reveals Himself to man. In doing so, he too hastily relieves the knight of faith from his secondary duty to the universal for the purposes of his primary duty to God.
posted by Tim Hoskins at 5:00 PM
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