Bourgeois Nation: a review of "The Right Nation"
By David J. Shaw
Conservative watching is in vogue these days. Formerly the domain of left-wing groups seeking to marginalize conservatives, mainstream media is increasingly beginning to pay attention to conservatives as conservatives. From the Washington Post to CNN, more and more stories are focusing on the conservative movement, not merely as a subgroup of the Republican Party, but as a movement in its own right. Most notably, the New York Times now has a reporter dedicated to the "conservative beat." Joining the fray are two British writers. John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, with their new book The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America. Micklethwait and Wooldndge, both writers for the Economist, approach America as detached foreigners and veteran observers. While not without bias or preference, they are nevertheless able to view America and its conservative movement as a whole, and frame their analysis within a larger picture. The result is a remarkably insightful, relevant, and readable book on the American conservative movement. This accomplishment is achieved because Micklethwait and Wooldridge understand that American conservatism and American exceptionalism must be understood in relation to one another.
I.
The :hes;s of 7>:e Right Nation is that American conservatism exp'.r.ns American exceptionalism. The reason Amer.cj :s so d-.rYerent from France or the rest of Western Europe :s recause of the modern American conservative moverr.er.:. There is no foreign equivalent to American conservatism. Indeed, Americans largely misunderstand "conservative" European parties. "Christian Democrats" are not "Christian" in the same way that James Do'oson is "Christian." Conservatives in Europe are nothing like conservatives in America. As a result. Micklethwait and Wooldridae araue, America is fundamentally a more
conservative nation.
Micklethwait and Wooldridge's thesis is compelling in that America is different from Europe and one of the most striking differences between the two is the existence of a distinctively American conservatism. But, is America different because America is conservative or is America conservative because America is different?
II.
The Right Nation is both a "portrait and an argument." The portrait is better than the argument. Micklethwait and Wooldridge provide a Tocquevillian survey of modern American conservatism, ranging from an overview of the past to an analysis of the present to predictions about the future. With brevity and wit characteristic of writers for the Economist, Micklethwait and Wooldridge are able to give a broad overview while also providing a plethora of detail and careful analysis. The book is divided into four parts: history, anatomy, prophecy, exception. The first three sections are the portrait; the last, the argument. Before these topics are discussed, however, Micklethwait and Wooldridge define American conservatism and what makes it distinct. American conservatism shares with traditional conservative political philosophy a deep suspicion of state power, a preference for liberty over equality, and an abiding patriotism; it deviates from traditional conservatism in that it is populist, anti-establishment, and progressive in outlook. Thus, American conservatism is a contradiction. It is conservatism heavily influenced by classical liberalism (and I believe a dose of progressivism). The result: social conservatives and libertarians, both operating under the same basic rubric, both part of the same "movement." Despite the incongruity of American conservatism, this meshing of competing ideologies has produced a vibrant political force. How? in.
Chapters one through four answer this question, covering the rise of conservatism in America. Micklethwait and Wooldridge's history of modern American conservatism is concise and compelling. It is the most interesting aspect of their work because it lays the foundation necessary to understand the rest of The Right Nation.
The story of American conservatism's rise to dominance begins, ironically, with its utter defeat. In the 1950s, conservatism was the refuge of marginalized cranks. Some of these were deservedly marginalized: elements of Ayn Rand are goofy and Joe McCarthy was both a bully and a shameless self-promoter. Others were simply born in the wrong century. Whatever the case, liberalism dominated. Three things began to spark a change. The first was the rise of credible right-wing intellectuals-most notably economists. These economists, ranging from Hayek to Friedman (both at the University of Chicago), argued for the superiority of the free market over government interference and clashed directly with the Keynesian orthodoxy of the day. The second and third factors Micklethwait and Wooldridge point to can be generalized as the shifting of the political center of gravity to the South and the West. The South began to be dissatisfied with the Democratic Party-particularly its stand on civil rights-and the West continued to grow and its population tended to be more libertarian in outlook. These strands-the intellectuals, the demography, and the racism-all came together in the person of Barry Goldwater and his 1964 presidential candidacy. Goldwater, an Arizonan and thus a westerner, was a conservative of libertarian leanings who relied on the ideas of the free market intellectuals and who broke the Democratic stranglehold on the South. He also lost in a landslide. In his loss, though, was the foreshadowing of the coming conservative dominance.
Revitalized conservatism, while necessary to explain the "Right nation,7' is not sufficient in Micklethwait and Wooldridge's estimation. The conservative rise to power must be understood both
through the emergence of a credible conservative alternative and the liberal loss of credibility. The 1960s was a remarkable decade. The optimism of the early 1960s is only matched by the pessimism of the late 1960s. And in this shift, the unified liberalism that had confidently governed the country since the 1930s cracked. The New Left radicalized the Democratic Party and, in doing so, alienated millions of traditionally Democratic voters-white ethnics, Roman Catholics, union members, and more. Nixon built on this with his rhetoric of the "Silent Majority"' and, while not a conservative by any means, continued to lay the foundation for conservative power. All of the elements that had begun to germinate with Goldwater were in full blossom by the time of Ronald Reagan.
If the story of the latter half of the twentieth century, at least in terms of American politics, is the rise to dominance of conservatism-as Micklethwait and Wooldridge claim it is-then how do you explain Bill Clinton? The answer is threefold: (1) Bill Clinton was elected as a moderate-a Southern centrist corrective to Northeastern liberalism; (2) when Bill Clinton tried to govern as a liberal, as he did from 1993 to 1994, he was soundly rejected; and (3) the successes of the Clinton era are moderate, even conservative, in nature: welfare reform and balanced budgets. Bill Clinton illustrates not that liberalism was still viable but that the only viable national Democrats were moderate, non-liberal ones. Thus, The Right Nation argues, the political center of gravity has shifted right. George W. Bush may have just barely won in 2000, but America is more conservative than it is liberal.
IV.
Surveying the current landscape of American conservatism. Micklethwait and Wooldridge note p.vo main thrusts: the first is the intellectual and political ieader-ship-the brains: and the second, the grassroots-the brawn.
One rhing that separates American conservatism from American iiberaiism-and helps explain its dominance-is the sense of purpose that is possesses. The current conservative establishment, or counter- establishment, came to maturity and defined itself against what it perceived as a liberal monolith. It is ridiculous to speak of the conservative movement as a "vast right-wing conspiracy." at least in the sense of a coordinated cabal, but there is a sense of "us" versus "them," and "we" are all on the same side. The Right Nation captures this as it examines the intellectual and political leadership of conservative America. Think tanks, such as the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the Cato Institute, feature prominently as does Bill Kristol's Weekly Standard. Micklethwait and Wooldridge also highlight the emergence of right-wing media outlets, most notably the Fox News Channel and the "blogosphere," including Andrew Sullivan and Glenn Reynolds. These new media are more than simply a corrective to an establishment media biased against conservatives; they are more potent because they are self-consciously conser-vative-they take sides without apology, something established (liberal?) media can only do with great risk to its own reputation.
The brawn of American conservatism can be roughly divided into two categories: antigovernment conservatives and social conservatives. The former is composed of an assortment of tax-cutters and gun nuts; the later, primarily religious conservatives. The superficial contradiction is striking: the first group wants government out of people's lives; the second group wants government in people's lives. This contradiction would seem insurmountable (and might indeed be) except for the fact that there is significant overlap between the two: the same people who own guns, want lower taxes, and think the government should stay out of their lives also attend religiously conservative churches and -.van: :o see both abortion and gay marriage bar.r.ed. The ideas defining American conservatism may be dichotomous, but the movement itself is a spectrum. There are enough conservatives who define themselves as both pro-gun and pro-life to bridge the gap between the libertarians who desire to legalize marijuana and the Christians who want to ban alcohol (at least for now).
V.
Having observed both conservatism's rise to, and its possession of, power, the authors next address its future. Will conservatism dominate or decline? In Micklethwait and Wooldridge's estimation, both are possible. Demographics, cultural trends, and recent history seem to point to a bright future for conservatism in general and the Republican Party in particular. At the same time, conservatism has its pitfalls. There is much contradiction in the conservative movement-is it too much to imagine it fracturing and imploding? The Right Nation explores both possibilities. The advice it offers? The Republican Party must avoid becoming "too Southern, too greedy, too contradictory." That is, avoid overemphasizing divisive social issues such as abortion and avoid abusing the privileges of power and running up massive deficits. In order to grow and maintain hegemony, conservatives must keep their current coalition together and continue to attract more people to it. Extremism scares moderates, so, Micklethwait and Wooldridge stress, conservatives must shun extremism.
In the final aspect of their portrait of American conservatism, Micklethwait and Wooldridge examine conservatives "behind enemy lines": black intellectuals, college students, and women. Blacks, youth, and women are traditionally liberal constituencies. Conservatism is making inroads, though. Black intellectuals, ranging from Thomas Sowell to Alan Keyes to Ward Connerly, are strong advocates against affirmative action and for school vouchers. The College Republicans is a massive student organization that boasts of producing Karl Rove and serves as a farm team for the Republican Party. Conservative women, particularly the blonde bombshells on Fox News, are wrestling "women's issues" away from Democrats. The trend for conservative America is bright.
VI.
Is American conservatism the cause of American exceptionalism, or is it a consequence? The Right Nation argues that it is the cause. America is different because America is conservative. I disagree. America isn't truly conservative, or, rather, America is only conservative according to a thoroughly American definition of "conservatism." There is no true Right-wing in America, nor has there ever been. Monarchy and fascism never caught hold in America; nor, for that matter, did true Left-wing movements such as socialism and communism. The United States may be to the right of contemporary Europe, with its greater tolerance of economic inequality and support for the death penalty, but not long ago it was to the left. Fundamentally, though, America is neither Left nor Right but Center.
The reason, I believe, lies in America's founding. America represents a pre-radicalized version of modernity. The roots of the American Revolution are, at their most ambitious, classically liberal. Thus, America is essentially moderate. Regime level questions were settled irrevocably in 1787 and nothing since then has represented any significant deviation from them. The Civil War, even, was fought over the appropriate application of those founding principles. Have there been changes or shifts? Undoubtedly, but they have been subtle and without acknowledgement.
The Progressives are, perhaps, the most ambitious American movement since its founding. Even they, though, sought not to repeal or overturn but only modify what the founders wrought-to achieve Jeffersonian ends through Hamiltonian means.
America is comfortably liberally democratic. I mean that not in an Americanized understanding of "liberal," which thinks only on the level of small party politics, but rather as a statement of great party politics, for all modern American conservatives are liberal democrats at heart. And they share this heritage with "Liberal Democrats." The quibble between American "conservatives" and American "liberals" has nothing to do with liberalism or conservatism. At best it deals with an argument over the precise interpretation of "life" or "freedom," and typically only truly relates to power and who gets to dole out the rewards to whom. "The business of America is business," the saying goes, and how true it is. Americans care about money. Religion is important, too, but only to a moderate degree. America isn't the Right nation, it's the bourgeois nation.
Conservative watching is in vogue these days. Formerly the domain of left-wing groups seeking to marginalize conservatives, mainstream media is increasingly beginning to pay attention to conservatives as conservatives. From the Washington Post to CNN, more and more stories are focusing on the conservative movement, not merely as a subgroup of the Republican Party, but as a movement in its own right. Most notably, the New York Times now has a reporter dedicated to the "conservative beat." Joining the fray are two British writers. John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, with their new book The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America. Micklethwait and Wooldndge, both writers for the Economist, approach America as detached foreigners and veteran observers. While not without bias or preference, they are nevertheless able to view America and its conservative movement as a whole, and frame their analysis within a larger picture. The result is a remarkably insightful, relevant, and readable book on the American conservative movement. This accomplishment is achieved because Micklethwait and Wooldridge understand that American conservatism and American exceptionalism must be understood in relation to one another.
I.
The :hes;s of 7>:e Right Nation is that American conservatism exp'.r.ns American exceptionalism. The reason Amer.cj :s so d-.rYerent from France or the rest of Western Europe :s recause of the modern American conservative moverr.er.:. There is no foreign equivalent to American conservatism. Indeed, Americans largely misunderstand "conservative" European parties. "Christian Democrats" are not "Christian" in the same way that James Do'oson is "Christian." Conservatives in Europe are nothing like conservatives in America. As a result. Micklethwait and Wooldridae araue, America is fundamentally a more
conservative nation.
Micklethwait and Wooldridge's thesis is compelling in that America is different from Europe and one of the most striking differences between the two is the existence of a distinctively American conservatism. But, is America different because America is conservative or is America conservative because America is different?
II.
The Right Nation is both a "portrait and an argument." The portrait is better than the argument. Micklethwait and Wooldridge provide a Tocquevillian survey of modern American conservatism, ranging from an overview of the past to an analysis of the present to predictions about the future. With brevity and wit characteristic of writers for the Economist, Micklethwait and Wooldridge are able to give a broad overview while also providing a plethora of detail and careful analysis. The book is divided into four parts: history, anatomy, prophecy, exception. The first three sections are the portrait; the last, the argument. Before these topics are discussed, however, Micklethwait and Wooldridge define American conservatism and what makes it distinct. American conservatism shares with traditional conservative political philosophy a deep suspicion of state power, a preference for liberty over equality, and an abiding patriotism; it deviates from traditional conservatism in that it is populist, anti-establishment, and progressive in outlook. Thus, American conservatism is a contradiction. It is conservatism heavily influenced by classical liberalism (and I believe a dose of progressivism). The result: social conservatives and libertarians, both operating under the same basic rubric, both part of the same "movement." Despite the incongruity of American conservatism, this meshing of competing ideologies has produced a vibrant political force. How? in.
Chapters one through four answer this question, covering the rise of conservatism in America. Micklethwait and Wooldridge's history of modern American conservatism is concise and compelling. It is the most interesting aspect of their work because it lays the foundation necessary to understand the rest of The Right Nation.
The story of American conservatism's rise to dominance begins, ironically, with its utter defeat. In the 1950s, conservatism was the refuge of marginalized cranks. Some of these were deservedly marginalized: elements of Ayn Rand are goofy and Joe McCarthy was both a bully and a shameless self-promoter. Others were simply born in the wrong century. Whatever the case, liberalism dominated. Three things began to spark a change. The first was the rise of credible right-wing intellectuals-most notably economists. These economists, ranging from Hayek to Friedman (both at the University of Chicago), argued for the superiority of the free market over government interference and clashed directly with the Keynesian orthodoxy of the day. The second and third factors Micklethwait and Wooldridge point to can be generalized as the shifting of the political center of gravity to the South and the West. The South began to be dissatisfied with the Democratic Party-particularly its stand on civil rights-and the West continued to grow and its population tended to be more libertarian in outlook. These strands-the intellectuals, the demography, and the racism-all came together in the person of Barry Goldwater and his 1964 presidential candidacy. Goldwater, an Arizonan and thus a westerner, was a conservative of libertarian leanings who relied on the ideas of the free market intellectuals and who broke the Democratic stranglehold on the South. He also lost in a landslide. In his loss, though, was the foreshadowing of the coming conservative dominance.
Revitalized conservatism, while necessary to explain the "Right nation,7' is not sufficient in Micklethwait and Wooldridge's estimation. The conservative rise to power must be understood both
through the emergence of a credible conservative alternative and the liberal loss of credibility. The 1960s was a remarkable decade. The optimism of the early 1960s is only matched by the pessimism of the late 1960s. And in this shift, the unified liberalism that had confidently governed the country since the 1930s cracked. The New Left radicalized the Democratic Party and, in doing so, alienated millions of traditionally Democratic voters-white ethnics, Roman Catholics, union members, and more. Nixon built on this with his rhetoric of the "Silent Majority"' and, while not a conservative by any means, continued to lay the foundation for conservative power. All of the elements that had begun to germinate with Goldwater were in full blossom by the time of Ronald Reagan.
If the story of the latter half of the twentieth century, at least in terms of American politics, is the rise to dominance of conservatism-as Micklethwait and Wooldridge claim it is-then how do you explain Bill Clinton? The answer is threefold: (1) Bill Clinton was elected as a moderate-a Southern centrist corrective to Northeastern liberalism; (2) when Bill Clinton tried to govern as a liberal, as he did from 1993 to 1994, he was soundly rejected; and (3) the successes of the Clinton era are moderate, even conservative, in nature: welfare reform and balanced budgets. Bill Clinton illustrates not that liberalism was still viable but that the only viable national Democrats were moderate, non-liberal ones. Thus, The Right Nation argues, the political center of gravity has shifted right. George W. Bush may have just barely won in 2000, but America is more conservative than it is liberal.
IV.
Surveying the current landscape of American conservatism. Micklethwait and Wooldridge note p.vo main thrusts: the first is the intellectual and political ieader-ship-the brains: and the second, the grassroots-the brawn.
One rhing that separates American conservatism from American iiberaiism-and helps explain its dominance-is the sense of purpose that is possesses. The current conservative establishment, or counter- establishment, came to maturity and defined itself against what it perceived as a liberal monolith. It is ridiculous to speak of the conservative movement as a "vast right-wing conspiracy." at least in the sense of a coordinated cabal, but there is a sense of "us" versus "them," and "we" are all on the same side. The Right Nation captures this as it examines the intellectual and political leadership of conservative America. Think tanks, such as the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the Cato Institute, feature prominently as does Bill Kristol's Weekly Standard. Micklethwait and Wooldridge also highlight the emergence of right-wing media outlets, most notably the Fox News Channel and the "blogosphere," including Andrew Sullivan and Glenn Reynolds. These new media are more than simply a corrective to an establishment media biased against conservatives; they are more potent because they are self-consciously conser-vative-they take sides without apology, something established (liberal?) media can only do with great risk to its own reputation.
The brawn of American conservatism can be roughly divided into two categories: antigovernment conservatives and social conservatives. The former is composed of an assortment of tax-cutters and gun nuts; the later, primarily religious conservatives. The superficial contradiction is striking: the first group wants government out of people's lives; the second group wants government in people's lives. This contradiction would seem insurmountable (and might indeed be) except for the fact that there is significant overlap between the two: the same people who own guns, want lower taxes, and think the government should stay out of their lives also attend religiously conservative churches and -.van: :o see both abortion and gay marriage bar.r.ed. The ideas defining American conservatism may be dichotomous, but the movement itself is a spectrum. There are enough conservatives who define themselves as both pro-gun and pro-life to bridge the gap between the libertarians who desire to legalize marijuana and the Christians who want to ban alcohol (at least for now).
V.
Having observed both conservatism's rise to, and its possession of, power, the authors next address its future. Will conservatism dominate or decline? In Micklethwait and Wooldridge's estimation, both are possible. Demographics, cultural trends, and recent history seem to point to a bright future for conservatism in general and the Republican Party in particular. At the same time, conservatism has its pitfalls. There is much contradiction in the conservative movement-is it too much to imagine it fracturing and imploding? The Right Nation explores both possibilities. The advice it offers? The Republican Party must avoid becoming "too Southern, too greedy, too contradictory." That is, avoid overemphasizing divisive social issues such as abortion and avoid abusing the privileges of power and running up massive deficits. In order to grow and maintain hegemony, conservatives must keep their current coalition together and continue to attract more people to it. Extremism scares moderates, so, Micklethwait and Wooldridge stress, conservatives must shun extremism.
In the final aspect of their portrait of American conservatism, Micklethwait and Wooldridge examine conservatives "behind enemy lines": black intellectuals, college students, and women. Blacks, youth, and women are traditionally liberal constituencies. Conservatism is making inroads, though. Black intellectuals, ranging from Thomas Sowell to Alan Keyes to Ward Connerly, are strong advocates against affirmative action and for school vouchers. The College Republicans is a massive student organization that boasts of producing Karl Rove and serves as a farm team for the Republican Party. Conservative women, particularly the blonde bombshells on Fox News, are wrestling "women's issues" away from Democrats. The trend for conservative America is bright.
VI.
Is American conservatism the cause of American exceptionalism, or is it a consequence? The Right Nation argues that it is the cause. America is different because America is conservative. I disagree. America isn't truly conservative, or, rather, America is only conservative according to a thoroughly American definition of "conservatism." There is no true Right-wing in America, nor has there ever been. Monarchy and fascism never caught hold in America; nor, for that matter, did true Left-wing movements such as socialism and communism. The United States may be to the right of contemporary Europe, with its greater tolerance of economic inequality and support for the death penalty, but not long ago it was to the left. Fundamentally, though, America is neither Left nor Right but Center.
The reason, I believe, lies in America's founding. America represents a pre-radicalized version of modernity. The roots of the American Revolution are, at their most ambitious, classically liberal. Thus, America is essentially moderate. Regime level questions were settled irrevocably in 1787 and nothing since then has represented any significant deviation from them. The Civil War, even, was fought over the appropriate application of those founding principles. Have there been changes or shifts? Undoubtedly, but they have been subtle and without acknowledgement.
The Progressives are, perhaps, the most ambitious American movement since its founding. Even they, though, sought not to repeal or overturn but only modify what the founders wrought-to achieve Jeffersonian ends through Hamiltonian means.
America is comfortably liberally democratic. I mean that not in an Americanized understanding of "liberal," which thinks only on the level of small party politics, but rather as a statement of great party politics, for all modern American conservatives are liberal democrats at heart. And they share this heritage with "Liberal Democrats." The quibble between American "conservatives" and American "liberals" has nothing to do with liberalism or conservatism. At best it deals with an argument over the precise interpretation of "life" or "freedom," and typically only truly relates to power and who gets to dole out the rewards to whom. "The business of America is business," the saying goes, and how true it is. Americans care about money. Religion is important, too, but only to a moderate degree. America isn't the Right nation, it's the bourgeois nation.
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