Sunday, May 15, 2005

Notes on the Times May 2005

Be a Man not a Mama's Boy

By Prof. Erik S. Root
In Perpetual Peace, Immanuel Kant makes a con­nection between war and chivalry. Of course, Kant despises all of this because he dislikes war. He loathes war to such an extent he wants to stamp it out completely, along with valor and chivalry. However, a part of eliminating the reality of war means making men unmanly in spirit. While we might disagree with Kant's Utopian idea, he seems to understand that there is something about chivalry and valor that is manly (properly understood). Is there something about mili­tary valor that encourages and trains men to be chival­rous? Women on the left disdain anything that smacks of a distinction between the sexes—such is their desire for complete equality. Feminists are sometimes more manly than men. However, more troubling, is that the so called Christian right is increasingly adopting such leftist thought—they hate manly displays of valor, and, yet, long for a chivalrous male. They cannot have both. In effect, many men are becoming effeminate and sensitive and the effect of inculcating those traits in men could spell doom for the Union.
In one of Plato's forgotten dialogues, Laches, wefind a discussion on courage, or manliness. Of course,like many of the Platonic works, we do not actuallyarrive at a conclusion, or a definitive answer as towhat it is. However, we are struck by the reason forthe debate: there are some who ridicule the practiceof men who engage in armored fighting or combat.Two of the characters in the dialogue, Lysimachus andMelesias, are distraught because they are ashamedtheir fathers let them live a "soft life." According toLysimachus, there is something "noble for a youth tolearn fighting in armor." The discussion turns quicklyto education and its role in developing courageousmen. Another interlocutor, Nicias, asserts that gym­nastics and horsemanship benefits "free" men becauseit instructs them in matters of contest and war, defend­ing oneself, and finally in the "noble study" of "ordersand battle." Nicias then sums up the benefits of thistraining: " • r ^ " T • • !
We shall further attribute to it no small addition: this knowl­edge would make every man in war not a little more confident
and more courageous than himself. And let us not consider it dishonorable to say—even if to someone it seems to be a rather small thing—that the man will also appear more graceful and where at the same time he will appear more terrible to the en­emies through his gracefulness.
This passage is even more important when we consider that in the Greek, avopeiog, the word for courageous (which appears for the first time in the dialogue), comes from the word avrp meaning man. The meaning of the word avSpeta may be rendered manliness. Somehow, then, there is a relationship be­tween courage and manliness. Furthermore, Socrates' interlocutors seem to agree that courage is one of the most prominent public virtues. As Socrates is ever wont to do, he inconspicuously directs his interlocu­tors to a consideration of higher things. The discus­sion of the Laches thus proceeds to a discussion of the soul—and courage is apart of a well ordered soul.
As the discussion moves into this realm of utmost importance, the characters of the dialogue begin to utter several oaths—"By Zeus," "by the gods," etc. When we are considering the whole, the gods are in­voked and reason and the divine come together. Could it be that the divine supplements or completes our reason? Nevertheless, Socrates seems to affirm that the education of armor fighting provides an avenue in which young men might learn courage. Of course, Socrates is interested in the isness of courage, and it appears that:
He who does fitting things concerning human beings would do just things; and concerning gods, pious things; and he who does just and pious things must of necessity be just and pious. These things are so. And indeed, of necessity, courageous as well. For it is not the part of moderate man either to pursue or flee things that are not fitting, but to flee and to pursue what he ought—affairs, human beings, pleasures, and pains—and to abide and be steadfast whenever he ought.
In order to cut to the chase, the Laches affirms that the courageous man fights and stays in the ranks; he places a high value on duty to the city and the father­land. Ultimately, ridicule and disgrace, nay, feminin­ity in men, is more terrible than the risk of death. We need courage to defend the just and pious things. If this virtue is not installed in men, they will not have the character to defend the country when the need is most necessary. If we are to have courageous men in war—in anything—we must educate and train them to be courageous in peace.
In The Republic, Plato fixes the spirited (Su^oc;) part of our nature to courage. While spiritedness may be the seat of anger, Socrates seems to want to make it a "loyal ally of reason" and he "rebukes" the "ir­rationally spirited." It is true that spiritedness may be savage or tame, yet Socrates tries to find a way to har­monize the extremes in order to moderate man. Spe­cifically, if spiritedness may be employed in service of reason, then it may be properly moderated. Neverthe­less, courage is one of the qualities a city needs for its health, and for its survival.
The genuine confusion over what it means to be courageous has bewildered many Christians who feel uneasy about the war against those who supported the terrible acts of 9/11. This trepidation might not bode well for the Union. Leo Strauss, assessing Machia-velli, asserted that Christians were weak in this world. Men were ready to die for salvation than to do the same for justice. Christianity not only led to an un­dermining of loyalty to country, but it often lead to a non-resistance of evil. Rousseau agreed. Christianity preached servitude and he thought that it had a favor­able disposition to tyranny. As a result, he concluded that "Christians are made to be slaves." If there was one area where Machiavelli found Christianity not lacking, it was in pious cruelty. Christian spiritedness flourished in this one area—and it lead to theocratic despotism. Machiavelli seems correct in one sense: the Inquisition and other examples of religious perse­cution have existed in Christendom. Is Machiavelli right? Is Christianity of the same variety it was in his day? Can Christianity support political liberty, and can it moderate its own particular spiritedness?
America has a rich history of Christian support for liberty and this was most evident at the Founding. Protestants embraced a warlike manliness and "re­garded reason no less than revelation as-a gift of God." Failure to cultivate both leads to disaster as it did for Nicias who trusted divination more than his manly spirit thus leading to military defeat. According to the great Jewish philosopher Maimonides, the reason for the Jewish captivity was the sin of their turning
to astrology which taught them that their "fate was dependent on the heavens rather than on studying and practicing the art of war." In contrast, Protestantism found its heft from a type of manliness. It took much courage to stand up against the Catholic church.
Perhaps a sampling of a few sermons from the Founding era would suffice to demonstrate that a manly Christianity did exist. Nathaniel Whittaker preached in 1777:
Every soldier...pray for those he endeavors to destroy, and wish them their best, their eternal good. These are no more inconsistent in a soldier, engaging in a battle and doing his best to kill his enemies, than they are in a judge and executioner, who take away a murderer from the earth...How absurd then is the pretense that the gospel of Jesus Christ forbids us to take up arms to defend ourselves!
Or how about this from Samuel Davies in 1758:
When [our enemies] would enslave the freeborn mind and compel us meanly to cringe to usurpation and arbitrary power; ...what is then the will of God? Must peace then be maintained? Maintained at the expense of property, liberty, life, and every­thing dear and valuable?...No; in such time even the God of Peace proclaims by His providence, 'To arms!' Then the sword is, as it were, consecrated to God; and the art of war becomes a part of our religion.
Several more examples could be added here, but the selections ought to weigh on us. How was it that Christians were able to speak like this from the pul­pit? Part of the reason these sermons have fallen out of fashion results from the modern rejection of the enlightenment; many Christians consider it to be too secular, or too atheistic, to be trusted. While leftists reject the enlightenment because of their post-modern proclivities, the Christian right rejects it because it does not sufficiently invoke revelation. In that both groups reject the reasonableness of man, they are al­lies. However, even Aquinas trusted our God given abilities. He sanctioned just wars and the right to revolution. The enlightenment of the Founders found in Protestantism a manly Christianity worth preserv­ing. The result of their heroic efforts set about making the Union the first nation that was founded in explicit opposition to Machiavellian principles. If we utilize all of our God-given abilities, we might be able to reason about this together. We might note that we face challenges in the Christian community and that those challenges do affect the character of our men and of our nation. There are some things we must overcome, however, to stem the modern tide.
The modern male seems to have two character­istics. He is either a barbarian or a wimp. Barbaric boys are quite crude. They wear the same type of clothes in all situations, curse in public and expect to be lauded for it, talk loudly, and have off-color names for girls, etc. They are over confrontational and they might like to fight too much. They are consumed by spiritedness; their 6^(^05 is undirected by reason.
Wimps have none of these problems. They are in some ways men without chests. They lack Sufioc; and shriek at self-assertion. They are not ambitious and they are in need of confidence. They lack the strength to act and when they do act, it is not in a manly way. If they have a problem with someone, another man for instance, they do not confront that man, but retreat from confrontation, or they find another more passive avenue to effect some end or right some perceived wrong.
The manly male is opposed to mere aggression. His chivalry seeks honor by being protective of wom­en, and the fairer sex feels respected when they are protected; Manly men more properly respect women who properly understand, and desire, chivalry. How does this translate into national politics? Americans defend their country because they respect it. America is respectable because, even today, America's Found­ing, and her people, generally understand there is such a thing as good and evil, and that good is worth protecting while evil is not. Manly men, then, dem­onstrate courage when they are defending something worth defending. However, the sensitive male does not think about protection and defense in this sense. The sensitive man must see things from the woman's perspective. How many times have we heard sup­posed men exclaim that we ought not to invade Af­ghanistan or Iraq, but should "understand" our en­emy—as if that would stay future violence from the party of terror?
The chivalrous, and gallant, male opens the door for women, which is a show of strength, but the wom-
an goes in first. This order might say something about the true nature of the relationship—the man is the head but the woman is the neck—but women only get that treatment from manly men. The sexes are complimen­tary under these conditions. Women, though, will not find a sensitive man being chivalrous, but the women will be "understood" by the sensitive man. Manly men are "romantic about women," but the unmanly men are merely "sensitive" about women: "which is better? which is better for women?" The sensitive, and wimpy, male, then, is the unnatural male; he is the unmale. He has nothing of manly value to offer the true woman (a woman who either left or right is not trying to exert something like The Feminine Mystique upon all those who surround her). Aristotle believes that, for the most part, men are courageous and wom­en are moderate. It is up to both, as complimentary beings in society, to fashion it into a quality that is virtuous.
Women may not understand men, all their silly expressions, and their "battles in armor," but a prop­erly ordered manliness is what the country needs to defend itself, and to defend the orthodox understand­ing of marriage. If marriage is to survive, there needs to be a celebrated difference in the genders. Emas­culated men and masculine women (however passive their masculinity) are unnatural beings. Ultimately, attempts to change the nature of men will lead to a few men (perhaps more) being thoroughly confused. Oth­ers will be completely lost. Yet not all men will accept such blatant feebleness: "But the sensitive male can also be chivalrous, in a perverted way, by seeking honor in refusing to honor and by protecting (from chivalrous males) women who say they do not want to be protected. It's another case of throwing nature out the front door only to have it return through the back." The political lesson is that we cannot change nature. The reasonable Christian has God to thank for that.

The Radical in Rome

By Dr. Anthony Esolen
All through the week since the elevation to the pa­pacy of Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, now Benedict XVI, I have listened with a mixture of bemusement and exasperation to the chatter of western journalists. They call Pope Benedict a "hard-liner" - exactly what we who are committed to the word of Jesus Christ are commanded to be, not diverging in the least from His commandments, lest they be called least in the king­dom of Heaven.
Now of course I know quite well that being a "hard-liner" for a western journalist means oppos­ing the pansexualism that western journalists have thoughtlessly accepted, along with many other as­sumptions of the over-schooled urban elite. It means that Benedict XVI will not budge on those matters dear to such an urbanite's heart, or to some region rather to the south thereof. The reader can supply the list: Benedict will not "liberalize" Church teachings regarding divorce, abortion, sodomy, contraception, fornication, adultery, and women priests. In other words, in his faithful adherence both to the natural law and to what he reads as the express commands of Christ and His apostle Paul, Benedict is called an op­ponent of freedom. It never occurs to them to consid­er that it is they, in their championing of the sexually unmoored individual, who are opponents of freedom, not only moral freedom but political freedom too.
How so? I am reading a book by then-Cardinal Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism, and Politics. It is a collection of essays and letters that treat, from differ­ent perspectives, the political and ecclesiological ques­tions of our day. To read it (and that means to walk with heavy boots through a muddy translation of the original German and Latin) is to engage a mind mar-velously subtle and penetrating, able on every page to flash out insights, to make connections that are not at all obvious, but that welcome pondering. Let me introduce you to one line of reasoning that the reader discovers throughout the essays; it is a line of reason­ing that should endear Benedict to the true patriots at Patrick Henry College.
The foundation of modern democracy, he says, can
historically be traced back to the Enlightenment, and, further, to the flourishing of ancient Athens; but its deep moral underpinnings reside in Christianity. For the Christian vision not only provides the State with a moral compass it cannot provide of itself- a ground for trusting that reasoning embraces moral reasoning, that moral reasoning can lead us to the good and the true; it provides the State with a vision of the State's perfection, not in this world, but in the next, according to the ordaining wisdom of God. At the same time, the true Christian understands that salvation is not to be gained here in this life; specifically, the State will not provide our salvation. That understanding relieves the State of a devastating burden. Paradoxically, says Benedict, it allows the State to be a legitimate State. The Christian vision, and it alone, allows us to work within the sphere of what is necessarily imperfect, ac­cepting it, even cherishing it.
Jesus Himself instructs us in this separation: "Render unto Caesar what is Caesar's, but render unto God what is God's." His saying ought not to be con­strued as recommending that the faithful retreat from the world. What Jesus says uproots both the Roman adulation of the State and the Jewish trust in a kind of theopolitical salvation: "This equation of the State's claim on man with the sacral claim of the univer­sal divine will itself was cut in two." In this regard, Benedict duly notes that Paul and Peter recommend for Christians a sane and holy modus vivendi: they are to obey authorities, who have their legitimate sphere of activity, given them by God Himself; yet they are never to capitulate to the idolatry that the Romans exacted to prop up their State. The prophet Jeremiah, too, inveighed against a confusion of faith and politics that in his time would have reduced faith and de­stroyed any hope for rational political action:

Jeremiah sees himself faced with theopolitical behavior that he wishes to replace with national politics for reasons of theologi­cal responsibility. The theopolitics of his opponents consists of their being convinced of an absolute guarantee on the part of God for the Temple, for Jerusalem, for the continued existence of the house of David, and they treat this guarantee as a political and military factor even though from the point of view of rational politics there is nothing to indicate this kind of security. Jeremiah in contrast demands rational politics which in conduct with regard to Babylon would be guided by the actual conditions of power and the possibilities that flow from these; it is precisely this that he sees as an expression of faith in God and of the responsibility to be shown before God.

The crucial mistake is to look to the State for what only God will bring, and only in His good time; or, with liberation theologians (whose errors Benedict ex­poses carefully and relentlessly), to see the State as the embodiment of the promised Kingdom of God. Chris­tianity is our guard. When we abandon it - or the foreshadowings of it that God has written upon the hu­man heart, the law that used to be called "conscience"
— then the State resumes its old and tyrannical place as object of worship. Benedict therefore reads the twen­tieth century as a resurgency of statist idolatry, nor does it particularly matter, says he, whether the idola­try calls itself Fascism, or Nazism, or, we might add, the modern welfare democracy, a symbiosis of sexual irresponsibility and State aggrandizement: "Anyone who looks more closely and does not let himself be blinded by phrases will discover sufficient similari­ties between the disaster of that time [that is, Hitlerian Germany] and the forces that today proclaim as salva­tion revolution in itself, the denial of order in itself." What such idolatry rests upon is a theology of works
- political works, but always human works; and such a theology, says Benedict, is expressly rejected by the New Testament, by the gospel of grace.
The Radical in Rome, then, places strict limits upon the authority of the State, among other reasons to safeguard its very existence, lest it destroy itself in growing into a tyranny. In a similar fashion he renounces the idea of the Church as a kind of State, amenable to human manipulation. Benedict's ecclesi-ology is based on the reality of martyrdom: the Church is never to be considered as an institution, much less a human institution, but as a Body whose witness of community is always a witness of those particular per­sons into whose keeping the gospel was entrusted, and who died for the truth they received. We do not make the Church, he insists. We make the State, but we are given the Church, as we are given the gospel. Those, then, who argue that the Church could change its teachings regarding, let us say, homosexual relations, are arguing that the Church is a human institution, like a State, with a constitution that may be amended
at our pleasure. Indeed, they conceive of the Church not as a State whose foundation is the natural law, but as a modern State, the provider of this-worldly salva­tion for all; a tyranny whose other names include The Cultural Revolution and The Third Reich.
Here my Protestant brothers and sisters may be wondering what Benedict believes about their com­munions, and how they fit in his vision of the Church. Of course since Benedict is Roman Catholic he ac­cepts the teaching that the mystical Body of Christ, the Body that includes all believers (even some who did not quite know that they were believers, but whom Christ has mysteriously called anyway, for He has sheep whereof His shepherds themselves do not know), is embodied in a particular way by means of apostolic succession. But he rejects, vehemently, any attempts by misguided ecumenists on all sides to alter or squeeze what they are given as truth, to come up with some "ecumenical" agreement that will be mod­erately acceptable and moderately unacceptable to everyone, and then to coerce the believers of the com­munions involved to accept the compromise. This too he sees as tyranny - and recommends that Protestants reject it!
Instead, just as in the realm of politics he advises us to wait for our salvation from the Providence of God, so in the realm of ecumenism Benedict repeats the wisdom of the reformer Melanchthon: that we will enjoy unity again ubi et quando visum est Deo, where and when it shall please God. In the meantime, the real work of ecumenism is done not by theology, but by love and gratitude. First, says he, we should appreciate how great is what we share: we read the Bible as God's holy word; we confess three Persons in one God, and Jesus Christ as true God and true Man; we practice baptism; we believe in the forgiveness of sins; we share "the fundamental form of Christian prayer and the essential ethical instruction of the Ten Commandments read in the light of the New Testa­ment." We could go on for a long time listing what we have in common; but Benedict goes so far as to urge us to appreciate where we differ. For once the "poison of hostility" has been drawn out, we can thank God for those differences, not that the Truth can ever be many, but that our very diversity, our being apart, can be used by God to make us one again. Benedict confesses how deeply Protestantism and Catholicism in Germany have relied upon one another, indeed have learned from one another. Perhaps an example from our own country is apropos here. How greatly have my Catholic friends benefited from the unswerving de­votion among Evangelicals to the literal Word of God, in the face of so many delusive modernisms! And, if I may presume, how greatly have my Evangelical friends benefited from the stalwart defense of life that has been mounted by the Catholic church, and by its abiding confidence that the Word of God is written on the human heart, in the natural law?
That would be an ecumenism of love and gratitude, as I have said; but more depends upon it than our good will towards our fellow Christians. The survival of Europe itself, and perhaps of the Europe known as the United States, is at stake. For Benedict sees the imminent collapse of the west, and has taken the name of Benedict to recall all of us to a solemn and ancient ideal. Fifteen hundred years ago, the Roman state was exhausted, and yet whatever was decent and noble in it
was preserved - not by senators, but by men in small communities, the monks, who gathered to work and pray. Can we really look at our last century and insist that the Vandals have not already arrived? Or can we turn on the television and insist that they have not set themselves up as our rulers? It is time, he thinks, for a renewal of that monastic ideal, in the form always of communities - communities, I would say, like Patrick Henry College.
The old patriot of Virginia and our new radical in Rome, you see, have hearts for many of the same things. Long live the memory of the former, and may God grant the latter many days to come!


Dr. Esolen is a professor of literature at Providence College in Providence, Rhode Island. He has pub­lished several books and translations and is a contrib­uting editor to Touchstone Magazine

How to Read the Bible Redemptive-Historically

By Jeffrey Cavanaugh
How do you read the Bible? That may seem like an odd question. What do you think the Bible is? What is it for? Is it a collection of stories with a moral point? Is it a book of doctrine, the basis for a system­atic articulation of what you believe? Is it a book of solutions to the problems you face from day to day? Or is it far more than all of these?
Most of us are familiar with all the Sunday School stories of the Old Testament. We've all heard the stories of biblical "heroes" like Joseph, Joshua, Gideon, Esther, David, Daniel, Shadrach, Meschach, Abednego, and many others. All too often, however, these scriptural accounts are treated simply as sto­ries, and the application drawn from them usually has something to do with how we're supposed to follow the example of these brave people and be courageous, steadfast, faithful, and the like. The closest thing to a theme that most evangelicals see in these stories is "How to do great things for God." This misses the point. The Bible is far, far more than a collection of stories. It is the record of what God has really done in history. There is one grand theme running throughout all of Scripture, and the point of the stories of the Old Testament can't be properly grasped unless we under­stand the theme and read them with it in mind.
The way to understand the theme that ties all Scripture together is what many theologians call the redemptive-historical perspective. Put simply, the entire Bible is God's revelation of the story of His work throughout history to redeem a people to himself from sinful humanity, for the sake of His own glory. The point, the end, the focus of all of Scripture—Old Testament as well as New—is Christ. This means that every time we open the Bible and read a passage, we should ask ourselves how it fits in to this one grand theme. It is the point of all of Scripture, and, no less importantly, every part of Scripture.
To make clear how this affects our understand­ing of Bible stories, let's look at a few, first as they're normally interpreted, and then from a redemptive-his­torical perspective. First, consider the story of Gideon in Judges 6-8. A common reading of this passage
portrays Gideon as a hero who did great things for God. Preachers and teachers who miss the point of this story make Gideon out to be a courageous man of God whom God used because of his faithfulness and strength. Look at the passage again, though—Gideon was a sniveling coward who tried crazy games with fleeces and dew to get out of obeying God. Gideon's story points to Christ in that, just as God used the weakness of Gideon's character to accomplish an amazing thing, God accomplished the greatest thing of all through the greatest weakness of all—the suffering and death of Christ on the cross.
This wrongheaded reading leads to other prob­lems in interpreting the passage. When interpreting the divine drinking game that God uses in 7:1-8 to whittle Gideon's force often thousand down to three hundred, many teachers will explain this by telling a story about how the men who lapped with their hands to their mouths were the best warriors, men who were alert and looking around, as if they were some sort of uber-Marines. This entirely misses the point, and it is an interpretation that isn't at all supported by the text. The point of the drinking game was to select not a certain kind of men, but a certain number. God was using this apparently arbitrary method to make sure, by using a ridiculously small force to gain victory, that there was no way the Israelites could boast in their own strength or take credit for the victory. Look at the tactics Gideon uses—you don't need liber-Marines to bang pots and wave torches.
A second example is the story of Esther. Like Gideon, the common evangelical reading of the book of Esther makes much of Esther's character, her courage in going to the king, and her faithfulness in responding to Mordecai's charge. This also makes for problematic application. We read the words "Who knows but that you have come to royal position for such a time as this?" and, trying to understand what the passage means for us, we conclude that we too have been placed in our position at Patrick Henry Col­lege "for such a time as this," that is, to be raised up as Christian leaders in America and return our culture

MTV and Democracy

By Julia Rybicki
In 1981, the launching of Music Television (MTV) created a new American and democratic institution. Its reality shows, music videos, political and hu­manitarian movements, and entertainment news, have both enabled MTV to be the arbiter of pop culture and allowed its celebrities to be active members in democratic man's existence. By creating a dichotomy between the fan and superstar, MTV highlights both the extravagance and commonality of celebrities. MTV presents an apparent aristocracy of celebrity that is ultimately palatable to democratic man through the equalizing factor of democratic ambition.
MTV markets a unique type of celebrity. Televi­sion is more interactive than newspapers and radio; the viewer can both see and hear the subject; thus, the subject can better connect with a viewer. MTV enables the viewer to become intimately familiar with (and invasive to) a celebrity's life. MTV also appeals to young popular culture consumers. Shows track the personal and professional lives of celebrities; through MTV the viewer goes into offices, studios, and even homes of athletes, musicians, actors, and anyone enjoying fifteen minutes of fame. MTV highlights the inequality between common viewers and millionaire celebrities, thereby presenting an aristocracy of celeb­rity. Because they appear to be better than democratic man, celebrities are ostensibly outside of the majority. Within the many types of celebrities, the democratic mind seems to recognize three broad categories of celebrity: the "star" (musicians, athletes, actors), the "entrepreneur" (designers, producers, directors), and the "heiress" (Paris Hilton). These MTV celebrities enjoy admiration with a democratic twist.
Democratic man functions within the majority. Tocqueville describes the omnipotence of the major­ity as a tremendous force, a faceless entity of equal individuals. This entity creates an allowable range of opinions, desires, and activities in society. The tyranny of the majority ensures that its opponents are punished and again confined within the boundaries of demo­cratic thought. Because he assumes all men to be equal to himself, he can ignore them. Consequently, when
democratic man notices a celebrity, he wants to know the similarities, differences, and the degree to which the differences threaten his notion of equality. MTV is the medium through which both democratic man and celebrity can function in the majority; it showcases the differences and the similarities between the viewer and the celebrity.
MTV creates only an apparent aristocracy; MTV glorifies celebrities by documenting every movement but degrades them by highlighting their democratic ambition. Tocqueville describes democratic ambition as seeking to acquire material goods, reputation, and power. MTV feeds the democratic man's ambition for material goods, including money, cars, clothes, and luxury, by presenting the celebrity as one who has attained those desires. Thus, celebrities and demo­cratic men unite through material goods—the celebrity exemplifies the democratic man.
Some would argue that talent separates the two and enables celebrities to attain material goods. MTV's aristocracy, then, is actual rather than apparent. Yet, this critique ignores democratic man's notion of equal­ity. The democratic man admires and interacts with the different categories of celebrity in terms of equality. In the democratic man's mind, he is like everyone one else, is capable of anything, and has an equal oppor­tunity to everything. Talent is merely a means to the end of democratic ambition—the universal desire for petty things. By setting celebrities apart, MTV reduces individuals to a lifestyle. While talent might enable the celebrity to attain wealth and fame, MTV presents it not as an intrinsic good but as an instrument to attain a lifestyle. Democratic man believes that he must simply cultivate the right means to achieve his ambition.
When watching MTV, democratic man sees one like himself in the soul of the "star" and the "entrepre­neur." They are easy for the democratic man to ad­mire, since they were once average people who simply found an opportunity to market a skill. MTV makes stars accessible; they have better lives than the aver­age citizen, but they were once average citizens. MTV presents their talents in terms of sales, popularity, and money; talent is a means to gain more "things." Jen­nifer Lopez, a "star," sings, dances, and acts, but more importantly she wears pink diamonds and Versace. Sean "P. Diddy" Combs, an "entrepreneur," runs re­cord and clothing labels, is an ardent political activist, and throws multi-million dollar parties in the Hamp­tons. The "star" and "entrepreneur" exemplify that cultivating the right means enables the average man to meet his democratic ambition; J-Lo and Diddy were once common east coasters with an ability to perform and an aspiration for wealth and fame.
The "heiress" has achieved the object of democrat­ic ambition to the point that she becomes disconnected from democratic man. Democratic man admires the "heiress's" vulgarity, but her lifestyle is so removed from democratic reality that it is above yet, beneath him. Paris is a celebrity so distant from democratic society that anything common (e.g., The Simple Life) becomes a vulgar luxury. She dresses her Chihuahua in Louis Vuitton and makes amateur porn. Democratic man despises her tastelessness, but her lifestyle fasci­nates him. He dismisses her as unreal. Her democratic ambition is uncontrollable; she is so grandiose that
democratic man can treat her as a superstar but reject her as easily as he does the next-door neighbor.
MTV reveals the celebrity to be another demo­cratic man with democratic ambition. Ambition is the same; the means to attain that end differ. Celebrities ultimately represent a lifestyle of petty things. They want material goods like everyone else. MTV enables democratic man to connect with the "star" and "entre­preneur," because it reveals the celebrity to be a suc­cessful, ordinary individual. The "heiress's" democrat­ic ambition is too vulgar; so democratic man dismisses her like he does his equals. Democratic man and celebrity safely exist in the majority. MTV ultimately nurtures the majority's ambition by simultaneously presenting the celebrity as a glorified being with more money, better cars, and prefect clothes and as another person with the same democratic ambition. MTV, thus, gives the democratic man what he wants—the assur­ance that everyone really is alike.

Love and Philology: The Necessity of Christian Ideology

By Travis Timmons
As Richard F. Thomas states, philology is "a relationship of affection,' 'respect,' and 'close proximity' to a 'text,' [which] necessarily involves reverence on the part of the critic toward the text." Despite ideological differences between those critics and scholars who believe that objective truths about language and literature may be discovered using philo­logical methods and those who do not believe this, it is the understanding that philological activity neces­sitates proximity to texts that provides both structur­alist and poststructuralist theorists with the common understanding that "what is at stake, then, is clearly the nature of reading." This is of great importance since the attitude one adopts while "reading" is highly scrutinized in current literary studies. In order to join in this dialogue, one's ideology must be perceived as being inclusive to those who have been previously prevented from participating. Christian critics and scholars are suitably equipped for this task. Affection, respect, and reverence toward "the other" are concepts deeply embedded in Christian doctrine and practiced in daily actions. A Christian who truly practices this ideology can approach all texts with sincere care, an attitude that is attractive in the current environment of critical values that desires to "valorize term B."
Sadly, Christianity is often associated with western hegemony and brutality due to historical episodes such as the Inquisition, the Thirty Years War, and colo­nial imperialism. This results in the conception that Christian ideology is oppressive. In this regard, the signifier "Christianity" is cloaked in a symbolic mode of representation far removed from its signified—the essence of Christianity. If Christians are to dialogue fruitfully in the poststructuralist environment of liter­ary studies, they must overturn this misrepresentation of Christianity. Christian theorists must demonstrate a humble awareness of negative historical stereotypes and attempt to overturn these through participation in literary studies that achieves trans-cultural connec­tivity. Christianity, by its very nature, is apt for such engagement.
Before illustrating this, however, a there must be a
clarification. I am not arguing that Christian ideology must be compromised in order for participation in lit­erary studies to be achieved, nor do I advocate such an approach. Rather, I want to show that before Christian critics can be listened to, they need to first listen sin­cerely to others. The goal for Christian ideology is to be accepted as a legitimate critical voice. Yet this does not mean that tenants of the Christian faith are aban­doned in the process. It is reasonable to expect that if Christian critics first demonstrate care in achieving dialogical connectivity, the tenants of Christian ideol­ogy can be accepted in the same manner in which it is recognized that postcolonial or feminist theorists have certain tenants that cannot be compromised. A mental­ity favoring inclusive participation does not necessar­ily mean compromising an ideological core. Instead, it is the nature of the core beliefs that matters; and this is why Christianity offers a valuable and indispensable critical voice.
Philology concerns the nature of reading. The pertinent question, then, is whether philological methods or ideology—a precondition from our exist­ing in a particular culture and time—determines how we read a text and what interpretative conclusions will be decided upon. Jonathan Culler challenged the as­sumption that texts can be read outside the framework of ideological preconceptions by arguing that textual interpretation requires ideology that both guides and constrains our application of philological methods. Today this is a commonsensical notion initiating its own set of issues. Barbara Johnson observes: "Read­ing through expectation ('the screen of received ideas')—rather than through an encounter with the text's language—leads to blindness." She continues that interpretive "blindness" prevents us from encoun­tering "unexpected otherness," preventing us from learning "something one doesn't already know." This awareness leads to asking the question of how each reader is oriented toward a text, and consequently an examination of the ideological framework that influ­ences the reading.The deconstruction movement highlighted certain previous ways of reading that reinforced western modes of dominance over "the other," which Stephen Owen describes as "not immediate, and not imme­diately one's own." Owen's comment implies that encountering otherness causes surprise because it distant from our own immediate experience. Thus, in order to understand what is "other," it is tempting to first desire it as a possession, using one's ideology to mark it as one's own. Deconstructionists challenged this stance it by demonstrating the instability of exist­ing hierarchies that practiced this form of dominance. For instance, New Critics in the South attempted to explain away the complexity of William Faulkner's novels by claiming that his fiction possesses a homog­enous set of values that are "heterosexual, male-cen­tered, white, and Christian." It was not until the advent of post-structuralism in the 1960s that this view was overturned and Faulkner's work was appreciated as a profoundly modern corpus in its complex treatment of sexual, racial, and religious themes. This example poi­gnantly illustrates the agenda of the deconstructionist project and the pejorative categories associated with Christianity, which is grouped with other oppressive and previously dominant ideological values.
The association with oppression, however, could not be farther from the essence of the Christian faith. In reality, poststructuralists ought to find aspects of Christianity complimentary with their own framework. Most importantly, Christian ideology is akin to the de­constructionist project in the sense that it is opposed to ideological movements that practice cruel oppression. Christians are commanded to follow Christ's example of love and concern for humanity. This doctrine is inclusive since it upholds the dignity of all humans. Otherness is treated with respect, not with the desire to possess it. This is congruent with Thomas' definition of philology as "a relationship of'affection,' 'respect,' and 'close proximity' to a 'text.'" A Christian can ap­proach the unfamiliarity of otherness with open recep­tion and legitimate care. Like the Bereans, Christians are called to read carefully. If Christians are truly practicing their faith when engaging in exegesis, they cannot help but be welcomed as concerned members of the literary community.
Nevertheless, the stigmatized signifier "Christian­ity" still stands. To many critics and scholars "Christi­anity" stands for dominance and oppression. Respond­ing to this conception is a crucial test for Christians.
If this stigma is to be overturned, it must be done with philological action that does not ignore past oppres­sion or erect elitist barriers between "us" and them." Philology should not be used as a tool to prove that "we" are right and "they" are culturally backward. This antagonistic attitude is unhealthy and will only create further alienation between cultural groups. In order to achieve trans-cultural connectivity, Chris­tians can affirm the common bond provided by human experience and cognition that throughout history has been lived out and is documented in the scriptures, which itself is a treasure-trove of human experience.
The ability to strengthen existing cross-cultural connections is another benefit of Christian ideology. Carolivia Herron argues that philology serves a valu­able function in asserting interconnections between works from differing historical periods and cultures in a way that is complimentary and beneficial for both works: "[T]hrough philological tools I can demon­strate that the African oral epic, Ham-Bodedio, was composed in a manner that illuminates the manner in which Milton dictated Paradise Lost." Herron notes that participants on both sides will show interest: "Miltonists are too curious about Milton to stay away from scholarship such as this—they are compelled by their own love of Milton to consider African epic." For Christian critics and scholars, interconnectivity is meaningful within Christian ideology because Chris­tians are called to extend themselves across cultural barriers by action that demonstrates love and concern for all humans in the name of the gospel.
The assertion of textual interconnectivity is a crucial component of poststructuralist theory; it acts as a political counterbalance to ideology emphasiz­ing canonized cultural dominance over lesser-known works. In the instance of Afro-American literature, Herron states that developing interconnections "is a political method for bringing African and Afro-Ameri­can literature before the minds and considerations of those who hold the power of canonical reading lists in their hands." Christian ideology would be a sympa­thetic and sincere audience in such cases. Subversive genres, such as Afro-American literature, would be "revalorized," while polemic reactions against hege­mony could be defused by the example of Christian ideology.
A Christian ideological identity requires Christians who passionately practice their faith in both their lives and their work. Without this sincerity, Christians will be unable to revalorize the signifier "Christianity" and thus lack a legitimate footing for participating in the contemporary critical environment as commentators on complex issues such as race and gender. If they are excluded from these debates, however, it will be difficult for Christian critics to comment on notions of God's transcendent relationship to language and litera­ture. It is only by beginning this process with Christ-like love that we can achieve participation. Christians are called to imitate the example of Christ in this
respect—to observe, listen, and live actively in our world and apply this passion to literary studies. Chris­tian ideology is an invitation for all people to partici­pate in eternal beatitude. This open hand, however, can only be extended with love and care; established by philological work that searches for comparison and commonality across cultural barriers.

Knee-jeck Ideology and Reflective Argument

By David J. Shaw
In every era there seems to be those who prefer knee-jerk ideology to reflective argument. In the 1990s there were "Clinton-haters," people who accused the forty-second president of virtually everything and were willing to believe virtually anything—provided it was negative. There were also Clinton-defenders who broadly grouped all critics together and dismissed them as "haters." Calling the John Birch Society cranks is one thing; categorizing Kenneth Starr with them, a former B.C. Circuit Judge and Solicitor General of the United States, is another. Both the "Clinton-haters" and his staunch defenders fall within the category, for lack of a better term, of "partisan hacks"—callous, shallow people who care for no other perspective than their own; who, indeed, seem incapable of conceiving of any perspective other than their own; or, perhaps (and this is most damning), care more about power or money or prestige to acknowl­edge any perspective other than their own.
This era has its own version of partisan hacks. Take, for instance, Liza Featherstone. A writer for the Nation, Ms. Featherstone has an article in December of 2004 issue on the evils of Wal-Mart. The entire ar­ticle is interesting in that it reveals Ms. Featherstone's desire to be thoughtful yet, due to her unflinching presuppositions, her complete inability to be thought­ful. But one sentence in particular stands out. "Un­like so many horrible things, Wal-Mart cannot be blamed on George W. Bush." The presumption of this sentence, combined with its wonder, credulity, and didacticism, stretches my mind. Who, I am tempted to ask, is dumber? Ms. Featherstone or her readers? The answer depends on this point of analysis: did Ms. Featherstone write that sentence tongue-in-cheek? If so, she is either mocking her readers or mocking the uninformed perception of her readers. (Perhaps she is both mocking some readers and sharing a joke with others.) This, were it true, excuses the sentence. The tone, however, of both the Nation generally and the rest of Ms. Feathersone's article particularly, makes this explanation unlikely. Partisan hacks tend to lack humor—at least as related politically. If the butt of the
joke is their ideology, they are offended; if the butt is an ideology they oppose, they believe it unflinchingly.
The sad fact is Ms. Featherstone probably believes that "so many horrible things" can be blamed on George W. Bush. And, not only Ms. Featherstone, but many (most?) of her readers probably share her opin­ion. Indeed, Ms. Featherstone & co. not only believe that "so many horrible things" are Bush's fault, but that the litany of "horrible things" is so long, so many, that it comprises most horrible things. How else can one explain Ms. Featherstone's need to carve out an exceptional "horrible thing," i.e., one not caused by Bush?
In writing this sentence, Ms. Featherstone places herself above her readers. She has perspective broad enough to perceive of a horrible thing not caused by Bush. Her readers are generally incapable of seeing this and must be alerted to its existence. This also demonstrates Ms. Featherstone's open mindedness. She is not so blind as to attribute evil only to Bush. The world, Ms. Featherstone implicitly proclaims in her wondrous sentence, isn't that simple. It is com­plex. Bad things can occur apart from Bush. Not many—certainly not most—but some can and do. Take, for example, Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart, according to Ms. Featherstone, is a bad thing and it exists apart from Bush. It is the result of consumerism. Con­sumerism is the product of capitalism as modified by Henry Ford. Now, Bush supports consumerism, so he is not off the hook, so to speak, but nonetheless, he is not to blame in the same way that he is to blame for the environment, the deficit, dead children in Iraq, the economy, joblessness, homelessness, homophobia, hate crimes, racism, Islamophobia, the curtailment of civil liberties, the rise of the Religious Right, intoler­ance, the insurgency in Iraq, dead and wounded Amer­ican soldiers, high oil prices, Halliburton corruption, Enron corruption, etc.
If we were to ask Ms. Featherstone what other "horrible things" Bush isn't to blame for, I wonder what answer we would get? The Holocaust, maybe? After all, he wasn't born yet. Maybe the Great Depression? In this light, the absurdity of Ms. Featherstone and her ilk becomes apparent. We laugh because we hate. Ms. Featherstone is trapped in her own perspec­tive; we are on the outside, and we are able to see its flaws, to perceive its shortcomings. Of course, we who are on the right are not the only ones who see Ms. Featherstone's insular extremism. There are those on the left who, while despising George W. Bush and his policies, would never imply that Bush deserves blame for all or even most "horrible things."
The dichotomy, then, is not "right-left." Rather, the dichotomy is knee-jerk ideology versus reflective argument. There are Liza Featherstones on the right,
too, possessing the same laziness, committing the same intellectual sins.
But what of ourselves? Do the ideological com­mitments that we make necessarily exclude us from participating in thoughtful discourse? Simply because we can perceive Ms. Featherstone's absurdity does not necessarily mean that we escape her errors. I only ask the question. Asking the question is important because asking it helps mitigate the self-ghettoizing tendency that we all possess.

Heaven is Full of People

A reponse to Ronald Bailey's article "Is heaven cheifly populated by the souls of embryos?"
By Zachary Gappa
"What defines a human being? In Reason magazine, Ronald Bailey presents a philosophical argument against the humanity of embryos. Bailey has been arguing this point for some time now. He first at­tacked the issue from a scientific standpoint, attempt­ing to prove in numerous articles that embryos are equivalent to other cells and do not fully have human status. He was forced to adapt his attack after Patrick Lee and Robert P. George of National Review success­fully countered each of his articles.
In his latest article, "Is Heaven Populated Chiefly by the Souls of Embryos?" Bailey moves by neces­sity from a purely scientific to a more philosophical approach. He appeals to common experience and to his audience's sense of absurdity. He begins his attack with some basic facts. He explains, "Between 60 and 80 percent of all naturally conceived embryos are sim­ply flushed out in women's normal menstrual flows." In other words, conception often occurs but the con­ceived embryo never implants into the womb. It dies without its parents ever being aware of the conception. Bailey explains that half of these lost embryos have an abnormal genetic structure, but the remaining half would likely have developed into children if they had properly implanted. In other words, the majority of embryos die because they fail to implant in the womb.
Bailey's attempt in the rest of the article is to prove the absurdity of the conservative belief that embryos are humans. He is trying to force conservatives into a tight corner where they must either accept his argu­ment or claim an absurd position. If he can prove that the right-to-life position is absurd, then he has won. He explains, "Bioconservatives ... do not advocate the rescue of naturally conceived unimplanted embryos." He sees this as a contradiction, for conservatives claim to believe that "unimplanted embryos are the moral equivalents of a 30-year-old mother of three children." They are not, however, raising an outcry about the holocaust-level of embryonic death. Bailey believes that, to be consistent, conservatives across the nation
should be working hard to find a solution to this mass-death. Moreover, Bailey argues that if conservatives are not working towards this solution, then they must recognize that embryos are not really people.
Bailey's example is not balanced. He partially mischaracterizes the right-to-life position by failing to take into consideration the knowledge of the average conservative. The average conservative does not know that conceived embryos are flushed out in a woman's menstrual flows. This information is simply not common knowledge. The fact could never be known through experience, for no woman would notice a tiny, just-conceived embryo passing out of her system. The embryo is lost at the exact time when it would normally have just implanted into the womb. It is only through hearing the information from some other source that the average man would know about this large-scale embryonic death. The knowledge is simply not widespread.
There are, however, some who are aware of em­bryonic death, but even these people cannot know when the embryos actually die. Sex sometimes results in conception and other times it does not, but only when the embryo does actually implant and grow can its parents recognize that conception has occurred. Af­ter all, even a miscarriage is hard to detect if the em­bryo is not developed enough. Most men, even if they did know the general facts of embryonic death, would not be aware of a single specific death. So how can Bailey expect widespread mourning? Does he expect mourning for the general fact that embryos are dy­ing? The death of the 30-year old mother, on the other hand, is specifically known by people. If a 30-year old woman dies, there is a known time, place, and body, but when an embryo dies, none of these are known.
Bailey's expectations do not take into account the nature of human mourning. Humans have a hard time comprehending the horror of massive death. People largely mourn catastrophes by word only. For instance, everyone will acknowledge the awful evil of the Jewish holocaust during World War II. There were, how­ever, many people at that time in those countries who were able to ignore the horrible reality of what was happening to those Jews. Moreover, the average man today is much more moved to mourning by a child dying on his home street than by a million people dy­ing in another country. Joseph Stalin said, "A single death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a statistic." As wrong as it may seem, there naturally is greater hu­man mourning when people encounter a death that is personal and very real to them. A lack of emotional response to statistics does not prove the inhumanity of embryos.
In addition to a specific instance of death, people also need a focal point for their grief. Russel Friedman and John W James of The Grief Recovery Institute ex­plain, "It is essential that [an] accurate memory picture be created or the [grieving] ritual will have little value for grievers." It is hard for a person to grieve properly when he does not have an object upon which to focus his grief. This especially applies to embryonic deaths. The grief people experience when considering the mass death of embryos has no outlet. These people are more likely to overcome this deficiency by refusing to think about the reality of this death altogether.
Another consideration Bailey seems to neglect is the harsh reality of embryonic death. A 60 to 80 percent embryonic death toll has been the common statistic for millennia. It is tragic, to be sure, but it also has a sense of permanence. Bailey is right to demand a horrified reaction from conservatives who have heard about embryonic death. He is further correct in be­lieving that conservatives should be promoting work towards a solution. He does not, however, take into consideration the practicalities of the situation. The average conservative can do nothing directly to find a solution to this problem. Even scientists cannot cur­rently do anything to save these embryos. The most the average conservative can do is to be aware of the problem and support work towards a solution. Beyond that, there is very little that he can actually do to help these dying embryos. The only real option that the average conservative would have is to stop having sex. Of course, even if this were a realistic option, it would still be detrimental, for the human race would die out. In other words, embryonic death is currently a neces­sary consequence of the preservation of the human race.
This cold, harsh reality affects the average conser­vative's attitude and response to the mass-death of em­bryos. He no longer wants to think about the reality of this death. He accepts the horror of it, but it depresses him to think about, for he knows there is no immediate solution that he can grasp or strive towards. Moreover, the average conservative knows that it is vital to the human race that he continue to procreate. It would be psychologically damaging for him to dwell on and mourn over the fact that many of his own offspring will never live past conception. Instead, he chooses to ignore the fact and focus on the practicalities of day-to-day life, procreating and raising the children that live.
Bailey further appeals to common human experi­ence by presenting an example. He explains that any person in a burning clinic would save a 3-year-old child before they would save 10 embryos in a Petri dish. On the basis of this example, he is once again trying to prove that people do not place human-value on embryonic life. His example does not, however, take into consideration all aspects of this theoretical situation. For instance, the average person would be more capable of saving the child than the embryos simply because the child is a more obvious object needing help (does the average man even know how to tell the difference between a Petri dish full of embryos and one containing a germ culture?). More important­ly, the child has a far greater chance of living, for he is completely self-sustaining. The embryos still need to be successfully implanted in a womb (this is always a risky procedure) and grow and develop without major complications. The odds are far greater that the aver­age man will be able to save the life of the 3-year old child than that of 10 embryos in a Petri dish. In a situ­ation where removing 10 embryos would likely cause them to die but saving a child would allow it to live, the conclusion is the same for everyone, regardless of their beliefs about the status of the embryos.
Finally Bailey comes to the point implicit in the title of his article: if embryos are really people, then they fill half of heaven. Bailey is pointing out one consequent of the belief that embryos are human, and he is subsequently appealing to his readers' sense of absurdity in an attempt to shock them into accepting his argument. Bailey counts on the probability that the average reader will not think through the heavenly im­plications of the conservative position on embryonic life. He wants to shock them into a sudden acceptance of his position. He hopes his readers' conception of heaven will contrast so sharply with the implications of the conservative position that they will reject that position outright. This kind of ploy does not make for a strong, lasting argument. A negative, surprised reaction does not mean that the average person does not accept the implications of the conservative posi­tion. Bailey is attempting to manipulate his audience into a reactionary acceptance of his ideas. It is as if he has lost the scientific argument and is straining to find some way to convince readers of his position.
Bailey concludes by first raising the question of whether new scientific research may help us to prevent some embryonic death, but then turning the tables and declaring that the answer to this question does not matter. He states that we should "absolutely not" stop embryonic research while new avenues are explored. He argues that the nation should overrule the "minor­ity" who believe that embryos are human, because embryonic stem-cell research could "cure millions." It is strange that, after spending an entire article attempt­ing to convince this "minority" that their views are mistaken, absurd, and inconsistent with their actions, he then completely dismisses them and calls upon the nation to ignore their concerns. It raises questions about how strongly he believes his own arguments. He is dismissing the very people to whom he has purport­edly been writing this article. He is attempting to take an invulnerable position: even if his argument is de­feated, he argues that it does not really matter anyway, because his position would "cure millions."
There is no question that Bailey is representing a view held by a significant portion of the populace. In light of the previous, scientific points he has lost to respondents Lee and George, this latest article seems to be his desperate grasp for some basis for his views. Bailey's unwarranted assumptions demonstrate his
lack of honesty and bias. His flawed examples and logical holes ultimately undermine his arguments. Bailey appeals primarily to absurdity and common human experience. He bases his argument on actions and ideas which he believes the culture already ac­cepts. While presuppositions and common opinion are indeed important factors in our reasoning, Bailey's change in approach seems weak. He has abandoned his former scientific intellectual reasoning and now seems desperately to be trying to convince his audi­ence of his opinion by any means necessary. Sadly, Bailey is left with very little argumentative ground to stand on. He has not given his audience any reason to believe that every embryo that dies is not human. He has not presented any reason to believe that heaven does not contain the souls of embryos.
Embryonic death is a sad occurrence, an occur­rence far removed from everyday human experience. This distance should not be twisted in an attempt to prove that embryos are not humans. Tragically, em­bryos have been dying on a massive level since the conception of mankind. Embryos are indeed human, and we should be working towards a solution for widespread embryonic death. We must not, however, lose sight of the bigger picture. We should strive to find a way to stop embryonic death, but the solution is not to reject embryonic life.

Ronald Bailey, "Is Heaven Populated Chiefly by the Souls of Embryos? " Reason Magazine, 22 Decem­ber 2004, http://www.reason.com/rb/rbl22204.shtml (accessed 25 April 2005).

Roll with It

By Steven Rybicki
you have four years here to actually experience some culture before you go out to "shape" cul­ture. I've spent four years here and some of the most rewarding cultural experiences I've had have been at the BlackCat and 9:30 clubs in Washington B.C. Seeing rock music, live, is one of the most wonderful, liberating, and educational experiences of your college life. If you don't believe me, that's fine, I'm not some Maoist out to grab a fist full of hair and drag you to a re-education center. However, you'll just miss out on something, I think, is valuable.
Since I'll be gone, I wanted to leave you all with a bit of parting assistance on how to take a crew of PHCers and get a party started at one of the fine es­tablishments of music in the D.C. area. First, B.C. is a great music center. It is a vibrant hub for all genres rock, hip-hop, and jazz. The best places to see these acts are the 9:30 club on V Street and the BlackCat on 14th Street in B.C. Both of these places have web-sites with thorough schedules. While 9:30 dabbles in reunion tours and hip-hop occasionally, BlackCat is primarily indie rock and elctronica. To find a show with potential, look for shows of bands you like on itunes or Google the names of bands on the schedules and rummage through their websites to see if you like their stuff. There are many new and up-and-coming bands who play this area frequently, and it's always worth it to catch them when they're still earning their street cred.
The best way to figure out what you want to see is compare ticket prices to names. Unless you LOVE a band, tickets for a show are not worth more than twen­ty bucks. Buy tickets online: 9:30 club tickets come through tickets.com and BlackCat works through Ticketmaster. It's recommended that you buy tickets online, the service charges are steep, about five bucks per ticket, but they guarantee your butt in the audito­rium. Also, don't waste money having the tickets sent to you, mark your tickets "Will Call" (this may seem challenging now, but just trust me, this option will be very clear when buying the tickets online). With "Will Call," all you have to do is present your credit card
and driver's license at the venue and they will give you your tickets, so there's nothing to keep track of.
There are innumerable benefits to getting to a couple of concerts each semester. For instance, this is a great learning experience: buying tickets online, picking them up, and functioning in a social environ­ment are skills that you will need. As crazy as this sounds: if you are going to function in a professional environment you will be doing "weird" stuff like pay­ing for goods and services with a credit card, planning and coordinating events, and, God forbid, your boss will probably take you to dinner at bars and restaurants in the city. At least I can only speak for where my boss took me when I worked at the Federal Election Com­mission.
So with this friendly little nudge, I hope that be­tween all your studies, you will take time out and see a couple of shows. Buring my tenure at PHC I saw Nada Surf, Live, The Bresden Bolls, The Becemberists (twice), Interpol, Beath Cab for Cutie, Bloc Party, and The Fiery Furnaces. Most were incredible shows, and the provided great memories with the people I saw the shows with. It's really worth the time.
With that zealous recommendation, here are some records you should listen to over the summer and when you return to campus... and go see them when they come to town!

Wilco: YankeHotelFoxtrot - A beautiful elegiac record. Undeniably, one of the most fragilely framed, yet deeply profound, records on all things American, especially after 9/11.

Interpol: Turn On the Bright Lights - This band, created at New York University, put out what will be one of the finest records of this decade. Their sound is nothing short of groovy.

Radiohead: OK Computer - Best record of the 90s: enough said.

Lucinda Williams: Essence - The greatest song-writer in the United States. Listen to whatever she releases.

The Decemberists: Picaresque - Colin Melloy, the literary lyricist from Oregon put out the most assured, emotional, jangling pop hooks this side of R.E.M. this year. Get this CD!

R.E.M. - Automatic for the People - Speaking of R.E.M., this album from 1992 is perfect. Human be­ings were meant to drive with windows down, system up, listening to these songs.

Spoon: Gimme Fiction - The best indie/pop hybrid in the United States. Spoon is a hard working group of guys who spin some of the best melodies in rock.

Bloc Party: Silent Alarm - The best British band of summer 2005, Bloc Party is an import who put on a great show and even elicited jumping and chanting from the pouting hipsters at BlackCat.

The Fiery Furnaces: Blueberry Boat - The Fiery Furnaces are the best live act I have ever seen. Their records are an amazing synthesis of electronic hooks and guitar jams, but live they are a sight to behold.

Okkervil River: Black Sheep Boy - An incredible debut album from writer/performer Will Sheff. He combines an incredible confidence in putting old-fashioned rock and roll hooks together with Southern Gothic lyrics.

Summer at Shatter Creek: All the Answers ~ Try­ing to one-up Eliot Smith's Figure 8 with his own "cheerful depression" record, the one man band, known simply as, Summer at Shatter Creek, creates a wonderful record finely prepared with the right amounts of hope, despair, and melody, all delicately packaged in forty minutes of music.

Patrick Wolf: Wind in the Wires - Hailing from the UK, Wolf combines an amalgam of musical styles and instruments to present a musical vision that is unique on both sides of the pond. Not quite rock, not quite folk, just the type of music Bright Eyes wishes he could be.

Death Cab for Cutie: Transatlanticism - The indie band that's not independent anymore (shhhh don't tell anyone). Transatlanticism is an epic, moody balancing act of emo posturing and heartbreaking melody. It will take you, warp speed, through the whole emotional gamut of high school (which by the way you will repeat here at PHC, good luck!).

Explosions in the Sky: The Earth is not a Cold, Dead Place - They come from Texas and call them­selves the loudest band in the world. They are the new kids on the "Post-Rock" block and can make the ears bleed from their guitar blare and drum kick, and the heart ache with great, sensitive riffs.

Dios: Dios - Music that sounds like The Beatles and the Beach Boys got together and sired Neil Young... understand? I think you just need to buy this record.

Rogue Wave: Out of the Shadow - A ray of pop sunshine. These guys may sing sad songs sometimes, but they've got a great sense of humor and, in a few years, could be the new Spoon.

The Flaming Lips: Yoshimi Battles the Pink Robots Part 1 - Music to bring a smile to your face. Yes, it might tax your patience when they go into their fa­mous techno-drone mode, but there's not a more joy­ous musical sensation around than hipshaking to the first bars of the title track, or thinking of that special someone when you sing "Do You Realize?"

Table Manners, Gender Wars, and Democracy: A Few Thoughts of Modern Etiquette

By Brianna M. Springer

Until recent years, people strove for perfection ... Now, however, it is our faults for which we are loved. Imperfect table manners are considered a sign of subscribing to the principles of democracy; ignorance of high culture to be an indication of spiri­tuality; and blurting, rough speech to be a clue to perfect honesty. ~Miss Manners

Never don any fair except for sable when you are in mourning. Never wear white shoes before Memorial Day or after Labor Day. Never position the knife blade away from the plate when setting the table. These dictums and a myriad like them are sadly the only conceptions most people have of etiquette. The impression they leave is hardly flattering, for they sound horribly stuffy. And in this age of free-spirits, spontaneity, and self-discovery, sounding stuffy is tantamount to social suicide. So etiquette, the once punctiliously-studied and venerated art, has become woefully-neglected and maligned. This state of af­fairs should not be. Etiquette is no villain, no enemy. Rather, etiquette is a victim, a martyr to modern edu­cational deficiencies and to egalitarian malaise.
The charges brought against etiquette by her de­tractors are as unthinking as they are numerous, and it is difficult to know where to direct my humble, yet honest efforts. However, three charges have recurred most frequently in my experience and it is these that I will address. The charges are: First, that etiquette is arbitrary and artificial. Second, that etiquette is confusing. And, third that etiquette is aristocratic by nature, designed to highlight the inequalities of man. I will discuss each of these in turn.
To begin, then: Is etiquette indeed arbitrary and artificial? The monosyllabic answer is: yes. It is true enough that etiquette is both arbitrary and artificial. But, before Mr. Backus begins any celebratory bar­barism, please allow me to explain. I believe those terms lead to a couching of the debate that is unneces­sarily negative. It is my position that arbitrariness and artificiality are not always bad and that, in the case of etiquette, they are actually necessary and laudable. I
understand that this is counterintuitive. Perhaps one or two examples might be helpful. First, I suggest that we take a lesson from the calendar. Yes, that kind of calendar, the sort you hang on the wall and depend upon for getting you to dental appointments or dates at the opera. The calendar is a bulwark of societal regularity and function, and there are few indeed who would deny its merits or its usefulness. I myself have spent countless pleasant hours contemplating the glories of our dating system. The pertinent, and oft forgotten, fact about the calendar, though, is that it was begun quite arbitrarily and artificially by Pope Grego­ry XIII in the late sixteenth century. There is nothing wrong with that. On the contrary, it was necessary to correct certain deficiencies in the old Julian sys­tem. After the change, the calendar more accurately reflected the pre-existent order of the natural world. And so it is with etiquette. Rules of etiquette may be arbitrary in their origins, but they are meritorious in their service. They too are meant to accurately reflect the pre-existent order of the natural world. And, as with Aquinas's conception of human law, etiquette can and should be amended whenever it transgresses natural law.
Now, for my second example, I ask you to sit back and imagine, if you will, a scene occurring several centuries ago. There you are a calm bystander on the streets of some small European hamlet. As you take the air your morning stroll is interrupted. Down the lane dash dozens of small Backi, the ancestors of my worthy opponent. Their arms are flailing in pure, un­restrained, boyish joy, and they are hurling small pro­jectiles of various kinds at several pretty lasses. The lasses seem to be enjoying the sport less assiduously, or keenly than the boys, though. Now, our ancestors, in their wisdom knew that merely telling the Backi not to throw things at girls would not stop them for a moment. Young boys are energetic, and they need exercise to keep their arms in shape. I think it is no coincidence, therefore, that the arbitrary and artificial contrivers of etiquette devised the custom of raising ones hat to a lady. This courtesy may be performed vigorously or delicately as the gentleman feels the need. Either is correct. Both are effective.
Now let us move to the second charge, namely that etiquette is confusing. I will point out first that there are two ways in which one can interpret the word "confusing." In the negative sense of the word many, many examples can be brought, not the least of which are the American tax code and German syntax. However, etiquette is not confusing in any such sense. Rather, etiquette is confusing only in the sense that each gender is mysterious to the other. It is understandable for a man to throw up his hands and say that he cannot remember which fork to use just as it is understandable for a man to grip his forehead and moan that his girlfriend is an enigma. Now, most men in their charitable, non-misogynistic moments do not wish to dispense with all women. Neither should they wish to dispense with all social rules merely because of the perceived complexities of the fork. Instead, they should take a scientific approach and seek to discover the operational theorem for each rule of man­ners. For the fork, this theorem has actually been dis­covered and is really quite simple. It can be grasped easily even by the uninitiated. I give it to you now as a bonus. Ready your memories, the mysteries of the fork are about to be revealed: Use the one furthest to your left. That is all. And it is not in the least confus­ing; it is even comforting. As a side note, the opera­tional theorem for women is equally simple, but I have no desire to destroy the livelihoods of psychiatrists everywhere by disclosing it. Also, some things must remain Gnostic or women's magazines will perish. Now we arrive at the third charge, that etiquette is aristocratic by nature, designed to tread upon the common man. This is a very heady charge in our
democratic era, but I fear this one least of all. For nothing could be further from the truth, and nothing is easier to refute by a simple appeal to reason. It is true that manners can be used to put down the unsuspect­ing, just as guns can be used to kill innocents. One hears tales of senators' wives in Washington, D.C. social circles that freeze the blood. But just as guns ought to be employed to save lives, so manners ought to be used as a means of grace, of dignity for all. You see, the rules of etiquette apply to everyone, small and great alike. And when they are employed properly they serve, like law, as a noble equalizer. This is dem­onstrated beautifully in the hierarchy of the table. You see, no matter how lowly the hostess or how lofty the guest, the hostess is the ruler at dinner. She is the one who begins the proceedings by taking the first bite, even if the Queen of England herself were in atten­dance. Etiquette, in this sense, bears a striking and not incidental resemblance to the Magna Carta. And, just as the tyrants of former times were brought to their knees by blind Justice, so hubristic socialites in our day can be cowed by blind Etiquette.
In closing, I implore you to examine the evidence in Etiquette's favor. Realize that etiquette serves as a bulwark and an enrichment of our society. It may have its flaws, but its merits are many, and they add up to a sublime and valuable whole; a whole well-worthy of the defense of all.
[Editor s Note: This was first delivered as a speech in response to Mr. Austin Backus.]

My Pleasure

By Tim Hoskins
For a month one summer while she was in high school, my mother worked at Wendy's in Mc-Donough, Georgia. Sometimes, she describes to us what it was like, the stress, the rude customers, the constant feeling that you have just been dipped in grease. Often, she will use this story as an explanation for why fast food does not appeal to her. Usually, she will theorize that everyone should be made to work in a fast food restaurant at least one in their lives. Invari­ably, she will point to this experience as her greatest motivation for finishing college.
In the January of my senior year in high school, I began my own experience with conventional entry-level employment. A man in my church was opening a Chick-fil-A only a few blocks from my house in Val-rico, Florida. He came to our Wednesday night youth group to solicit employees. I liked money and had little else to do before college so I applied.
For our first training session, four of us were carted off to an already established franchise to observe its functional splendor. Biann, the only girl in our group, was selected to learn the register at the front counter (which in restaurant slang is militaristically called "the front line") and we three remaining males were sent to the back to learn about the deep fryer, explained to us by a smiling Columbian man named Rodrigo.
Our second training session brought the whole "team" together for the first time. This classroom-ori­ented afternoon taught us about days off, overtime, sexual harassment, robberies, labor laws, and govern­ment mandated sanitary standards.
Out final training took place at the store on the night before its grand opening. Our families had been invited as a forgiving crowd of customers for our dress rehears­al. Despite the segregation of our previous training, it seemed that I was also destined for the front line. I was only little handicapped by having spent my hands-on training learning about breaded chicken and boiling peanut oil. The registers were brand new consisting of a touch screen with little pictures of each food item. It took a few weeks to learn to more arcane functions such as how to sell someone one solitary chicken nugget or
a grilled chicken sandwich with only half a bun, but it was not hard.
It was also that night I was acquainted with the bane of my existence. I had just sold someone's little sister a Chick-fil-A sandwich (a CFA to those on the inside) when my boss Jeff walked up. In the friendly and en­thusiastic tone he always used with "team members," he informed me that if any customer told me "thank you," I was to respond with "my pleasure." This policy did not please me for a couple of reasons: first, I am not the kind of person who says "my pleasure," and second, my dealings with customers were rarely pleasurable for me. The average American assumes that since one is working an entry level job one must be either: lazy, a drug addict, mentally retarded, a criminal, or an illegal immigrant. As a high school senior killing time be­fore college, this assumption did not sit well and to be required to inform then that I had enjoyed their abuse was intolerable and highlighted the powerlessness of my position.
This struck me most starkly one night just before closing. A man in scrubs with a hospital ID clipped on came in and ordered a CFA. He became indignant when I did not offer him barbeque, honey-mustard, or sweet and sour sauce to go with it. Now, while we will gladly provide these to anyone who asks, they are meant for chicken nuggets and so we do not automatically offer them with chicken sandwich orders. Rather than allow me to explain this, he drew himself up like a Baptist preacher and told me how I was worthless, had no pride, and would never amount to anything. I held my tongue and silently moved Dr. Jerk to the top of Pulitzer List, those whom I plan to strike with the first Pulitzer Prize I win. He grabbed the paper Chick-fil-A sack and stormed out as I called after him "my pleasure!" al­though the phrase "burning coals" was the predominant thought in my head.
My mother is right; it is worth it to finish college.

The Art of Tip Baiting

By Micah A. Towery
Tip baiting is a fine art, requiring great skill, grace and diligence. As a coffee shop employee you are not dependent on tips. These tips can easily accrue to hundreds of dollars in untaxed extra cash, which you can spend on various vices, habits, or necessities.
Tip baiting appeals to the two emotions most com­mon in humans: guilt and pride. It is about creating a particular impression: you, the poor, overworked em­ployee, rose early to assist the commuting masses in their worthy capitalistic endeavors, but have received little thanks or gratitude. The customer, either feeling guilty on behalf of his stingy fellow man, or wishing to have grateful coffee shop employees groveling at his feet, will tip a small amount, which, over time, will accumulate significantly.
To give such an impression of destitution, the employee must keep careful watch on the tip recepta­cle. When one sees anything more than a few dollars and some loose change, they must immediately, but discreetly, dump the excess into a hidden cup. It is a simple procedure and one cannot be remiss in his duty.
A tip receptacle may be any sort of container. But it should be subtle: no loud gaudy letters declaring "TIPS!" (read desperation) or silly phrases such as "Thanks a latte!" (read unoriginal and tacky), unless one is intentionally trying to appear pathetic, which might actually be an effective technique. Otherwise, such things are tasteless and give an impression of begging. Begging gives away whatever power the em­ployee has. No matter what, the employee must hold power at all times. One may object that the prideful tipper thinks the employee is groveling and begging; however, in truth, the employee is always holding all the cards, for he knows about the hidden tip cup. As soon as the prideful customer turns around, patting himself on the back for being so generous, the em­ployee may allow himself a knowing smile.
The type of monetary denominations in the tip jar is another important aspect of tip baiting. While keeping a low amount of money is important, one
should always keep at least two or three dollars in the tip receptacle, as if some kind soul gave a whole dollar as a tip. This sets both the precedence of tip amount, and establishes tradition of that precedent. The pride­ful tipper will be obligated to match this and the guilty tippers feel they should tip this amount at least.
After receiving a tip, the employee should give a simple "thank you," nothing more or less. It should be enough to express the necessary thanks, so as not to appear ungrateful, but never so much as to satisfy the guilt or pride of the tippers. These feelings are the weakness of the customer and should be exploited without their knowledge.
The denomination and amount of money is also important to prevent the phenomenon known as tip dipping. Oftentimes, in an attempt to come up with the right change, customers will grab money out of the tip jar to make ends meet or simply to avoid breaking a dollar (you know who you are!). Feigning igno­rance, they know that all the employee can do is give them dirty looks. Any sort of protest would reveal the employee to be the greedy grubber he is. The tip dipper knows this and exploits the weakness. Occa­sionally, there is a truly ignorant person, who would choose to believe that the tip jar is the cumulative generosity of some brotherhood of coffee drinkers (an idea inherently absurd considering the gluttonous hordes that would compose such a brotherhood). The tip baiter, however, can always spot a true tip dipper, as one sneaky bastard to another. An underhand dirty look is the sole retaliation for this protection racquet in which the tip dipper is engaging. That and spitting in his drink. This allows the employee another chance for the knowing smile.